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Abstract
Independent smallholders' certification in the palm oil industry has been recognized as a significant
challenge both in the academic literature and in the interviews conducted with experts prior to
writing this thesis. According to both sources, a massive certification of independent smallholders
seems very unlikely in the medium-run. At the same time, smallholders are a critical component of
the palm oil value chain, both in terms of production and land use. This thesis focuses on the
challenges palm oil independent smallholders in South East Asia are faced with when it comes to
certification. The paper is structured around four chapters. Chapter I opens the paper with an
analysis of the current context in the palm oil industry and of the rising concerns related to
sustainability. The main bottlenecks preventing smallholders to become certified are then developed
in Chapter II. In Chapter III, certification of smallholders is presented through the lens of the
collective action problem framework. Two case studies then illustrate the fact that certification can
be achieved. Based on these case studies, as well as on interviews with experts and on academic
papers, we formulate the necessary conditions to create a favorable environment for independent
smallholders to achieve certification before suggestingways to implement them (Chapter IV).
Thesis Supervisor: Matthew Amengual
Title: Assistant Professor, MIT Sloan School of Management
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Introduction
Palm oil is the second most traded vegetable oil in the world today, after soybean oil1, and has
experienced an extremely fast growth in the past 40 years. As demand increased, concerns emerged
regarding the social and environmental impact of production: palm oil was pointed at as being
responsible for deforestation, biodiversity loss, as well as various social conflicts. The Roundtable for
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) emerged when multinational corporations and civil society
organizations decided to unite forces to tackle these issues. The focus of this multi-stakeholder
organization is to work towards making palm oil production more sustainable.
Soon after it was created, the RSPO defined Principles & Criterias (P&Cs) that would guide palm oil
growers to produce Certified Palm Oil (CPO). The RSPO recognized that these principles were not
adapted to the situation of smallholder farmers and adopted specific P&Cs for smallholders in 2009
and 2010.
The profile of palm oil growers varies widely and goes from very large estates to smallholders. The
RSPO currently defines palm oil smallholders as: "Farmers growing oil palm, sometimes alongwith
subsistence production of other crops, where the family provides the majority of labor and the farm
provides the principal source of income and where the planted area of oil palm is usually below 50
2,hectares in size
PrieWaterhouseCoopers, "Palm Oil Plantation, Industry landscape, regulatory and financial overview", PwC Indonesia
reports (2012), page 5, last retrieved from the web on May 7th 2013:
http://www.pwc.om/id/en/publications/assets/palm -oil-plantation-2012.pdf
2 RSPO, "RSPO Prinples and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production: Guidance on Sdieme Smallholders", RSPO
Working Paper (2009), page 3
3
However, certification for smallholders has remained extremely difficult to achieve. In particular,
certification of independent smallholders (those who are not contractually bound to a mill) is the
most challenging, because they cannot benefit from the financial and technical support of a mill.
After several months of research and seven interviews I conducted with experts from the industry, I
was left with the impression that independent smallholders certification in the palm oil industry was
a very challenging issue and that a massive certification of independent smallholders seemed very
unlikely in the medium-run.
In this paper, we will try to answer the following questions: What are the barriers to certification for
smallholders? Are these barriers a threat to smallholders' competitiveness? What are the actions
undertaken today to make certification accessible to independent smallholders? What are the
necessary conditions for smallholder certification to become achievable?
We will see that these necessary conditions for smallholders to achieve certification are (1) to invest
in capacity building of smallholders, (2) to provide market incentives for certification and (3) to make
the certification process more accessible from a financial and operational point of view.
For practical reasons, the thesis will focus on examples in South East Asian countries, unless stated
differently.
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Chapter I: What has been the impact of RSPO standards on
the supply chain of Palm Oil?
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L.A The palm oil industry today: balancing expansion and sustainability
I. A. 1) The impact of palm oil expansion on deforestation and biodiversity
Palm oil production has been pointed at as being responsible for deforestation and important
biodiversity loss. These concerns are justified by two important facts:
-The expansion of palm oil crops: Agricultural expansion and intensification has been pointed out as
the biggest current threat to biodiversity3 in the academic literature. Vegetable oils are the most
rapidly expanding agricultural sectors4 and, among those, palm oil is the one experiencing the highest
growth.
3 Fitzherbert, Emily B., et al. "How Will Oil Palm Expansion Affect Biodiversity?" Trends in Ecology & Evolution
(2008), page 538-545
4 Fitzherbert, Emily B., et al. "How Will Oil Palm Expansion Affect Biodiversity?" Trends in Ecology & Evolution
(2008), page 538-545
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-The threat palm oil represents for biodiversity-rich ecosystems: Palm oil is grown in areas that are
particularly rich in terms of biodiversity, like rainforests and tropical areas. In 2008, oil palmwas
grown across more than "13.5 million ha of tropical, high-rainfall, low-lying areas, a zone naturally
occupied by moist tropical forest, the most biologically diverse terrestrial ecosystem on Earth'". In
parallel, fewer plant and animal species survive on palm oil plantations, compared with other
agricultural options'.
If nothing is done to prevent palm oil expanding on this type of lands in the future, many experts
recognize that the expansion of palm oil plantations would cause high losses in terms of biodiversity
and forested areas: "Although the extent to which oil palm has been a direct cause of past
deforestation is difficult to quantify, its potential as a future agent of deforestation is enormous.
Demand for palm oil is predicted to continue increasing, and globally, most of the remaining areas
suitable for planting are forested'".
Therefore, the increase in palm oil production that is expected could have dramatic consequences in
terms of deforestation and biodiversity loss.
5 Fitzherbert, Emily B., et al. "How Will Oil Palm Expansion Affect Biodiversity?" Trends in Ecology & Evolution
2008), page 538-545
Fltzheibert, Emily B., et al. "How Will Oil Palm Expansion Affect Biodiversity?" Trends in Ecology & Evolution
(2008), page 542
7 Fitzherbert, Emily B., et al. "How Will Oil Palm Expansion Affect Biodiversity?" Trends in Ecology & Evolution 23.10
(2008): page 538-545
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I. A. 2) Elements of context on pahn oil expansion: understanding the historic and
predicted growth
Today, palm oil is the second most widely traded vegetable oil in the global oil and fats industry". It is
the most important vegetable oil both in terms of production'and has become so in the last four
decades.
a) Historic growth:
The planting of palm oil for commercial purposes started in the beginning of the 2 0 'h century in
Congo, Malaysia and Indonesia. However, large scale expansion of palm oil plantation only started in
the 1960s. Growth from the 1980s to nowadays has been extensive the total cultivated area for palm
oil has increased eight-fold between 1980 and 2009, while the total production of palm oil grew nine-
fold in the same period"0 . In comparison, the overall production of vegetable oil increased by 335
percent in the same time period".
Figure 1 below shows the exponential growth of palm oil from 1970 to 2007. It highlights that
growth in world production was primarily driven by Malaysia and Indonesia during this period.
8 PrioeWaterhouseCoopers, "Palm Oil Plantation, Industry landscape, regulatory and financial overview", PwC Indonesia
=gga (2012)
9 Teoh, Cheng Hai, "Key sustainability issues in the Palm Oil sector", The Wodd Bank. IFC report (2010), page 4
10 Teoh, Cheng Hai, Key sustainability issues in the Pahn Oil sector, The World Bank, IFC, 2010, page 5
" Teoh, Cheng Hai, Key sustainability issues in the Palm Oil sector, The Word Bank, IFC, 2010, page 7
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b) Palm oil production today
Palm oil production is highly concentrated in South East Asia but other regions represent a high
potential in terms of future expansion.
Figure 2 shows the countries where palm oil is produced as well as an idea of the area covered by
palm oil plantations. We observe that production is concentrated around the Equator line, as palm
trees requires a tropical climate and environment to grow.
12 Sheil, D., et al., "The impacts and opportunities of oil palm in Southeast Asia, What do we know and what do we need
to know?", CIBOROctuMsida aperNoQS( 2009), Page 4, last retrieved from the web on May 3rd 2013:
http://www.afor.org/publications/pdf files/OccPapers/OP-51.pdf
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Figure 2: Countries producing pahn oil and area cultivated by country
In 2009, Malaysia and Indonesia accounted for 8 5% of the global production*" while Thailand,
Ecuador, Colombia and Papua New Guinea have experienced a steady growth in the past decades
and accounted together for 6,6% of the global production in 200916. "At present, relatively little oil
palm is grown outside Southeast Asia, but 410-570 million ha of currently forested land across
Southeast Asia, Latin America and Central Africa are potentially suitable for oil palm cultivation and
might be increasingly utilized as demand rises and agronomic advances are made.".
Figure 3 illustrates the current weight of palm oil in terms of area covered in 2008. This figure also
shows that there is a lot of potential for countries in other regions than South East Asia. Indeed,
since 2009, palm oil cultivation has expanded extremely fast in these latter regions and is predicted to
is Mittaine, J. F.., "The globalization of international oilseeds trade", Olgineux, Corps Gras, Lipides. Volume 19,
Num6to 5. 249-60 (2012)
16 Teoh, Cheng Hai, Key sustainability issues in the Palm Oil sector, The Wold Bank, IFC, 2010, page 5
Fitzherbert, Emily B., et al. "How Will Oil Palm Expansion Affect Biodiversity?" Trends in Ealogy & Evolution
23.10 (2008): 538-45. Print.(http://www.whrcorg/resourmes/published literature/pdf/WHRC REDDcrop suitability.
pdf)
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continue increasing. This expansion represents a significant economic opportunity for the countries
as well as a threat for the environment and biodiversity.
Oil palm
area %0
0
0-1
2-5
6-10
10-20
20-40
Source: How Will Oil Palm Expasion Affect BiodiverSIt -. in Eog tE o 23.10 2)08
Figure 3: Oil palm cultivation areas as a percentage of country territory in 2008
c) Expected growth in pahn oil industry
WWF predicts that palm oil consumption will have doubled by 2030 and tripled by 2050, compared
to our current consumption". Annex 1 offers an explanation to why palm oil is becoming so
demanded on the global market.
Given this huge increase, it is legitimate to ask where this additional production will come from and
how will it impact the environment and ecosystem of regions that are already under pressure. This
very same question led to the creation of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm oil, as we will see in
the next paragraphs.
18 WWF, "Palm Oil.", Web (2008), last retrieved from the web on 4 May 2013:
<http://wwf.panda.org/what-we-do/how-xwwork/businesses/transformingmarkets/solutions/methodology/multi
_stakeholders/palmoil/>
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I .B The emergence of the RSPO as an attempt to make palm oil production
more sustainable
I. B. 1) The debate on sustainability initiated by civil society organizations
a) How did the debate about palm oil sustainability start?
Environmental NGOs and members of civil society started becoming vocal on issues related to palm
oil and deforestation, biodiversity loss, and climate change at the end of the 1990s.
The debate around palm oil and sustainability became particularly predominant after 1997. In that
year, large forest fires took place in Africa, Brazil, Colombia andIndonesia. WWF Netherlands
further investigated on the causes of these fires and identified that the expansion of palm oil
cultivation was one of their underlying cause: in a report released by WWF Netherlands, it was
revealed that some of these fires had been started in order to clean the land and prepare it for palm
oil cultivation". After understanding the origins of these fires, members of civil society started to
consistently point out palm oil production as a main cause of deforestation, biodiversity loss, climate
change as well as social conflicts.
b) The Kit Kat 'powershock' for multinationals
A good illustration of the "Demonization'" of palm oil and how it affected multinationals would be
the fake advertisement Greenpeace made to denounce Kit Kat's use of palm oil. In this
advertisement, Greenpeace accused the production of the palm oil Nestl6 used for their Kit Kat to
19 AidEnvironnement, 2007, "Towards effective onservation strategies: the application of strategic principles to incease
the impact and sustainability of WWF onservation efforts"
' This term was used by Darrel Weber, General Secretary of RSPO in a BBC Food Program interview in October 2011
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be responsible for the extinction of orangutans and the slogan of the advertisement was 'Give
orangutans a break'".
Source: mternetetopaion.woxclpress.com
Figure 4: Greenpeace activist demonstrating against Nest16 and its 'Killer' Kit Kat'-
Nestl6 reacted instantly to Greenpeace's attack by asking them to remove the ad from the web.
However, the video soon became viral. Greenpeace succeeded in its strategy as Nestle stopped
working with some palm oil producers that Greenpeace had pointed out as acting irresponsibly with
regard to biodiversity and forest conservation.
This particular advertisement and the criticism generated by the civil society also had effects on other
multinationals, as they feared that they might be the next target of criticism if they didn't commit to
sourcing palm oil in a more responsible way'.
c) Palm oil's consistent unpopularity among civil society organizations and Western markets
consumers
Referring to Kit Kat's famous advertising phrase: "Have a break, have a Kit Kat"
Retrieved from the intemet on Mardi 26th:2013: intemetetopinions.wordpress.om
2 3 Based on an interview conducted with an expert working for a large palm oil producer and manufacturer
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Today still, palm oil is very unpopular among some of the most influential global NGOS. The
Rainforest Action Network (RAN), for example, still asserts the following on its website about palm
oil: "palm oil destroys rainforests", "palm oil threatens forest people" and "palm oil causes climate
change".
Civil society organizations have popularized the debate on palm oil and the negative environmental
and social impacts among consumers in the Western markets. Since the early 2000s, consumers from
Europe mainly but also from the United States, Japan and Australia have become more sensitive to
the topic of deforestation and loss of natural habitat for endangered species.
An iconic example in the United States is related to the girl's scout cookies. Two 11 year-old scouts
discovered in 2007 that the cookies they sold used palm oil that caused "the destruction of
irreplaceable rainforests and threaten(ed) the survival of humankind's closest relative, orangutans"24.
After several years of campaigning and with the support of the Rainforest Action Network's (RAN),
these two girl scouts received a lot of attention from the media in the U.S2s
From the early 2000s, the actors of the palm oil industry were exposed to a lot of pressure coming
from social and environmental NGOs. It is in this context of ongoing criticism from the civil society
organizations and the consumers that Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) was created.
I. B. 2) The emergence of the RSPO
In 2001, the World Wildlife Fund was exploring the idea of creating a Roundtable where the actors
of the palm oil supply chain would be able to interact and discuss about pressing issues specific to
their industry. And sustainability, as we have seen, was indeed a pressing issue for the industry.
Rainforest Action Network, "Gid souts and Palm Oil", Web (2011), retrieved from the intemet on Mari 26th 2013:
http://ran.org/girl-scouts-and-palm-oil
2s. This is an example several of my American-citizen dassmates have mentioned to me when I told them I was writing
my thesis on palm oil.
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Unilever, Aarhus United UK Ltd, Migros, Malaysian Palm Oil Association joined the effort of WWF
in 2002 and formed the Organizing Committee that would work towards the preparation of an
inaugural meeting. This inaugural event took place in Kuala Lumpur in 2003 and the 200 participants
from 16 countries signed a Statement of Intent for the creation of the RSPO'.
The RSPO was formally established a year later, in 2004 as an association governed under the rule of
Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code. It was decided that its seat would be located in Zurich,
Switzerland, its Secretariat based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and its Liaison Office is based in
Jakarta, Indonesia.
I. B. 3) A multi stakeholder organization working towards making 'sustainable palm
oil the norm'
a) What is the RSPO's mission?
RSPO was defined by its founding members as "a not-for-profit association that unites stakeholders
from seven sectors of the palm oil industry - oil palm producers, palm oil processors or traders,
consumer goods manufacturers, retailers, banks and investors, environmental or nature conservation
NGOs and social or developmental NGOs - to develop and implement global standards for
sustainable palm oil27". The RSPO is therefore a multi-stakeholder organization that serves as a
platform uniting all the stakeholders in the palm oil industry.
b) Who are the RSPO's members?
The RSPO has grown significantly since 2003 and had a total membership of 1088, in November
2012. The distribution of its members (Figure 5) shows that growers represent 15% of the
membership of the RSPO.
26 Infonnation retrieved from the offidal website of the RSPO, January 2012 (http://www.rspo.org)
27 Information retrieved from the official website of the RSPO, January 2012 (http://www.rspo.org)
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RSPO membership by stakeholder group
* Processors and traders
* Growers
Environmental NGOs
Social NGOs
* Consumer Goods -Manufacturers
* Retailers
Banks and investors
6%%6%/ 3 1 O %
source: sustainablepalrnoil.org (2012,
Figure 5: breakdown of RSPO members by category
Becoming a member of RSPO is voluntary but has become an implicit requirement for many
growers who want to supply to multinational corporations, according to PwC Indonesia".
c) The annual roundtables as a forum for all the palm oil stakeholders
Each year, the Round Table event (RT) is held and is a forum where the RSPO members can present
their work, exchange and take decisions. "Positioned as the world's largest sustainable palm oil
conference and held since 2003, the annual roundtable or RT is a platform to exchange views and
28 PrioWaterhouseCoopers, "Palm'Oil Plantation, Industry landscape, regulatory and finandal overview", PwC
Indonesia eorts. 2012, page last retrieved from the web on May 7th 2013:
http://www.pwc.com/id/en/publications/assets/palm -oil-plantation-2012.pdf
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experiences among various stakeholders in developed and developing countries; to strengthen their
co-operation and support in promoting sustainable palm oil. The annual roundtable is positioned as
an industry event organized to seek participation from players within the palm oil sector from all
around the world""
These annual roundtables have become very important along the years for the palm oil stakeholders
as they are an opportunity for members to present their progress, exchange best practices and
express their concerns.
d) RSPO's vision
RSPO ambitions to 'transform markets to make sustainable palm oil the norm"'
To date, the 'certified sustainable palm oil market' (CSPO) accounts for 14% of the total market. In
the following sub-chapter, we will analyze what RSPO has put in place so far to make its vision
reality.
I. B. 4) The creation of new standards and their expansion
In order to transform markets to make sustainable palm oil the norm, the RSPO has:
-Defined Principles and Criterias for sustainable palm oil production
-Defined indicators and processes to achieve certification (and discriminated between large
producers and small ones)
-Created various supply chain systems to diffuse the Certified Palm Oil
29 Soutc: rspo.org
30 Many interesting discussions can be seen on the YouTube Channel of the RSPO:
http://www.youtube.m/channel/UCJqrE0atpa0U-YQF4bWQfeature=
3 Rt10.rspo.org, "RT10 - Vision & Mission." 2013. Web. 12 May 2013. <http://www.rtlO.rspo.org/c/vision-
mission/>.
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a) Definition of Principles and Criterias for sustainable palm oil production,
The RSPO has set up Principles & Criterias (P&Cs) for sustainable palm oil in 2007 for palm oil
producers (that include smallholders). There are 8 P&Cs:
1. Commitment to transparency
2. Compliance with applicable laws and regulations
3. Commitment to long-term economic and financial viability
4. Use of appropriate best practices by growers and millers
5. Environmental responsibility and conservation of natural resources and biodiversity
6. Responsible consideration of employees and of individuals and communities affected by growers
and mills
7. Responsible development of new plantings
8. Commitment to continuous improvement in key areas of activity
b) Definition of indicators and processes for producers to achieve certification
RSPO has defined these general P&Cs while recognizing that there may be a need to adapt to local
contexts as well as different types of producers. The organization declares on its website: "The
Prinp les and Criteria have been interpreted to accountfor local conditions, resulting in natio nal standards that refka
local laws, regulations andbestpractices. These local intepretations are aligned with the globalRSPO standard and
are cerified as such 2".
If the Principles and Criterias are the same for every producer, the way to implement them varies
according to the type of producers: plantations, scheme smallholders (smallholders who sell their
3 2 Souro: Rspo.org
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fresh fruit bunches to a specific mill) and independent smallholders have different implementation
guidance to follow in order to become certified (cf. Chapter II for more details).
c) Creation of various supply chain systems to facilitate the diffusion of Certified Palm Oil
In order to facilitate the sale of 'Certified Sustainable Palm Oil', different supply chain systems have
been put in place:
-Identity preserved palm oil (which is fully traceable to an individual level of estate or smallholder
preserved from any mixing with other sources of palm oil),
-Segregated palm oil (which is very similar to identity preserved palm oil, the main difference being
that segregated palm oil can come from several estates or smallholders and therefore is not traceable
at the individual level),
-Mass Balance palm oil (which consists of a mix of CSPO and conventional palm oil),
-Book and Claim (the sale of CSPO certificates is separate from the sale of palm oil)'.
These systems all have specific implications on the supply chain:
-Producing and distributing Identity Preserved and Segregated Palm Oil require a high level of supply
chain integration. Both are based on a traceable and segregated system. Identity Preserved implies to
have palm oil from one origin (estate or smallholder) only processed in one mill, transported in one
tank and stored in one tank before being sold. Segregated Palm oil is similar, except the certified oil
can come from various sources. The production of this type of certified palm oil poses supply chain
challenges and represents significant additional costs.
3 3 Wodd Wildlife Fund, "Profitability and Sustainability in Palm Oil industry: analysis of incremental Finandal Costs and
Benefits of RSPO compliano", WWF reports, (2012)
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-The Mass Balance Palm oil also involves the coordination of the entire supply chain and poses
challenges.
-The Book and Claim system is the only system that does not require the coordination of the entire
supply chain. Indeed, it relies on the sale of Greenpalm certificates by the producers of fresh fruit
bunches (FFBs) in exchange of a price premium. Since the implementation of the Greenpalm
certificates in 2008, the price premium has fluctuated significantly. For example, Greenpalm
certificate price per ton of CPO (Certified Palm Oil) collapsed from USD 10 in 2010 to less than one
dollar in 2011 ", which significantly weakened the Book and Claim system.
For more details on these systems, please refer to Annex 2.
.C Impact of the RSPO standards on the actors of the Palm Oil Supply Chain
I. C. 1) Identifying the actors and influencers in the Pali oil supply chain
We can distinguish two types of players in the Palm Oil debate: the actors and the influencers
The actors include the traditional palm oil supply chain i.e. palm fruit farmers/producers,
plantations, millers, refiners, processors, manufacturers and retailers.
The influencers include social and environmental organizations, banks and financial institutions,
traders, industry associations, media and governments.
The table below gives a brief synthesis about the way these protagonists interact within the palm oil
supply chain:
34 New Britain Palm Oil limited, "New Britain Palm Oil Sustainability Report 2010/11", NBPOL Sustainability report.
(2010), page 46
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GovernFent inanciers and Environmental
Banks and social NGOs
Grower Miller Shipper Processor Shipper Manufacturer Retailer
IndustryTraders Mledia
associations
Source: inspired from Key sustainabilitr issues in the palm oil industry, World Bank (2O 10)
Figure 6: Map of the actors and influencers in the palm oil supply chain
I. C. 2) Understanding the operational challenges in the palm oil supply chain
At the producer's level
Palm oil fresh fruit bunches (FFBs) must be milled within 24 hours of harvest to preserve the quality
and freshness of palm oil. Thus all producers who do not own a mill (including smallholders) must
deliver their harvest rapidly to a nearby mill. In practice this often necessitates a close relationship,
sometimes contractual, with the company or government agency that owns the only mill within
delivery distance. The nature of these arrangements has a direct bearing on the type and direction of
environmental and development impacts associated with palm oil production.
At the miller's level
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Processing of fresh fruit bunches requires very high capital investment and scale. In some regions,
millers are often faced with the risk of operating below capacity.
Traceability of fresh fruit bunches is the biggest challenge for millers when it comes to certified palm
oil because in many cases, millers don't buy directly from producers. It is very common to have
traders as intermediaries in South East Asian countries. These traders make traceability of FFBs very
difficult for the millers (and the auditors).
Shipper/Processor
Traceability is also a great challenge for these actors when it comes to certified palm oil. It is actually
very rare to find processors and shippers who are able to work exclusively with these types of oil.
Among the exceptions, New Britain palm Oil is a company who has managed to achieve 100 %
certification by integrating its full value chain" (New Britain Palm Oil Limited Sustainability report
2010/11) and achieve full traceability.
I. C. 3) What has been the impact of RSPO standards on the top and the bottom of
the supply chain?
Not all the actors of the supply chain have been impacted evenly after the emergence of the RSPO:
those at the bottom and at the top of the supply chain are the ones who have been most exposed to
the emergence of the concept of sustainable palm oil.
Those who have significantly been impacted by the emergence of RSPO standards are the following:
1) Manufacturers and retailers
3 5 New Britain Palm Oil limited, "New Britain Palm Oil Sustainability Report 2010/11", NBPOL Sustainability eport.
(2010)
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Because the sell directly to end-customers, retailers and manufacturers have been impacted by the
emergence of the RSPO. This direct relationship with the end-customer has made them the perfect
targets for civil society organizations who have put a lot of pressure on them since the beginning of
the year 2000s.
WWF published the 2011 Palm OilBuyer's swrecardwhere the organization assesses 132
multinationals operating in Europe, Japan and Australia "against four areas which show whether or
not these companies are acting responsibly" with regards to Palm Oil consumption:
- Being an active member of the RSPO;
- Making a public commitment to RSPO -'certified sustainable palm oil';
- Disclosing how much palm oil they use;
- Showing how much of the palm oil they source is RSPO -certified."
This scorecard is a clear way to ensure multinationals commit to sustainable palm oil and respect this
commitment.
In 2013, several global companies have committed or renewed their commitment to source palm oil
from sustainable sources only. Dunkin Donuts is one of the most recent examples and has
committed to use 100% RSPO-certified palm oil by the end of 2015.
These public announcements further increase thepressure on retailers and manufacturers who have not
yet committed to source RSPO -certified palm oil and who sell on these markets.
2) Millers
36 WWF. "2011 Palm Oil Buyers' Soteaud.", Web (2011), last rtrieved from the web on April 3rd:
http://wwf.panda.org/what we do/footirint /ariculture/palm oil/solutions/resnonsible nurdiasing/sorecard2011/
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The millers who sell palm oil to customers (retailers and manufacturers) demanding certified
sustainable palm oil have experienced great changes since the emergence of RSPO standards.
Because they are the ones who produce the certified palm oil, they have to ensure that the fresh fruit
bunches they process have been produced according to the RSPO Principles and Criterias. This
means that it is the responsibility of the mill to 'prove' that the oil they produce can be certified.
Traceability poses the biggest challenge for them: they might not always know where the fruits they
process come from because traders will act as intermediaries between the farmers they source from
and the mill.
Mills who want to produce certified palm oil while buying fresh fruit bunches from outgrowers are
faced with the following choice: whether to help the outgrowers they buy from to produce fruit
according to RSPO standards or to stop buying from sources they cannot guarantee as certified.
In the recent years, many millers have been impacted by the RSPO standards because of the increase
in demand in RSPO -certified palm oil in various regions of the world.
3) Producers of fresh fruit bunches - Along with the mills, they are the actors that have been
directly impacted by the emergence of RSPO certification.
The Producers include plantations and smallholders.
Plantations
Most plantations in South-East Asia also possess a mill, as it is critical to process the fruit shortly
after it has been harvested (cf. Figure 6 above on the supply chain). We can distinguish two types of
plantations: those who only process the fresh fruit bunches produced on their lands and those who
also source from external producers, i.e. outgrower smallholders or small producers who do not own
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a mill. The plantations have been impacted in a similarway as the millers (given the fact that most
plantations own their own mills).
Several reports have shown that the impact of certification has resulted in net benefits for
plantations. For example, a report from WWF outlines that the benefits related to certification largely
outweighed the costs for big plantations". Teoh Cheng Hai, Former Secretary-General of RSPO
confirms the statement: "A survey that I conducted in May 2011 among nine plantation companies
that collectively accounted for about 45% of total production of CSPO globally showed that
implementation of the RSPO principles had resulted in considerable improvements in their triple -
bottom line performance (economic, social and environmental). At the plantation level, effective
implementation of best practices required by the RSPO standard had resulted in improvements in
operational efficiencies and reductions in costs. At the corporate level, the respondents reported that
certification had enhanced their corporate image and reputation and provided better access to
international markets "".
The impact of the RSPO standards has been positive on plantations, as the resulting improvements
in economic, social and environmental performance have outweighed the initial costs of achieving
certification.
Smallholders
In analyzing the impact of RSPO standards on smallholders, we need to distinguish scheme
smallholders from the rest of the smallholders (independent and associated):
37 'The researth found that although potential madet premiums served as the initial attration to certification, ead1
major category of benefits was, in and of itself, potentially capable of outweighing RSPO implementation osts. In
summary, business benefits gained from adopting the RSPO Principles and Criteria typically outweigh the costs of
implementation-in many cases significantly-yet often through unexpected and indirect channels", in Profitability and
Sustainability in the palm oil sector (WWF report)
38 World Wildlife Fund, "Profitability and Sustainability in Palm Oil industry: analysis of inaemental Financial Costs and
Benefits of RSPO ompliance", WWF reports (2012)
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- For smallholders who have a contract with mills (called scheme smallholders), certification depends
on whether or not the mill is willing to support the certification process, as we will see in Chapter II.
The emergence of the RSPO standards has only impacted the smallholders working with mills
interested in producing Certified Palm Oil. These smallholders may have achieved certification with
the help of their mill.
- For the independent and associated smallholders, the emergence of the RSPO standards has had
very different impacts, according to the type of mill they sell to:
For smallholders selling to mills that were not interested in producing certified palm oil, the impact
has been negligible for them. On the other hand; the impact has been significant for smallholders
selling to mills willing to produce Certified Palm Oil. In some rare instances, like in the case of New
Britain Palm Oil, the mill might have helped the smallholders achieve certification. In other cases,
mills might have required the smallholders to become certified with limited help. For these
smallholders, certification is a very big challenge, as we will see in Chapter II, and it is very likely that
they did not pursue certification. They therefore had to seek for other mills to sell to because they
couldn't comply with the mill's demand.
I. D Progress and limitations of the RSPO in 2013
Since it was created in 2004, the RSPO has made tremendous progress in terms of market share.
14% of the global Palm Oil production is RSPO certified to date". It also claimed, back in 2008, that
* Sustainablepalmoil.org. "The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) I Sustainable Palm Oil Platform."
(2013), last retrieved from the web 4 April 2013: <http://www.sustainablepalmoil.org/standards-
ce rtfication /certification-schemes /the -roundtable -on-sustainable -palm -oil-rspo/>.
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its members managed more than one third of the global oil palm area'. These figures are very
significant and show how rapidly RSPO has been able to expand within the palm oil industry.
However, the RSPO is still limited by various factors that they need to come around before reaching
their goal of "making sustainable palm oil the norm" in the global market.
The most significant limitations for Sustainable Palm Oil to become the norm so far are:
-The limited market demand for 'certified sustainable palm oil'
-The size of the market for non-certified products
-The unsustainable financial burden of certification on independent smallholder's shoulders
-The tension between the expansion of the standard and its integrity
I. D. 1) The limited market demand for 'certified sustainable palm oil'
Western markets are increasingly asking for sustainable palm oil. However, these markets represent
less than 20% of the consumption of palm oil and only a fraction of the actual consumption is
sourced from sustainable sources. In 2010, supply of sustainable palm oil exceeded demand': a
significant fraction of the sustainable palm oil produced could not find a buyer. A BBC Food
Program research in 2011 showed that even the paper certificates for Sustainable Palm Oil were not
finding buyers. An extract from this program can be found in Annex 3.
Given the patterns of the market, a question that is often raised by the experts and the media is the
following: 'Is there actually a demand for certified sustainable palm oil?'. This question is provocative
41 Fitzherbert, Emily B., et al. "How Will Oil Palm Expansion Affect Biodiversity?" Trends in Eology & Evolution
23.10 (2008)
PrioWaterhouseCoopers, "Palm Oil Plantation, Industry landscape, regulatory and finandial overview", bPw
Indonesia rports (2012), last retrieved from the web on May 7 2013:
http://www.pwccm/id/en/publications/assets/palm -oil-plantation-2012.pdf
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(because there is a demand) but it can be interpreted as: 'Is the demand sufficient to generate the
necessary changes in the industry?'.
Although many experts argue that multinationals like Unilever might accelerate the uptake of
Certified Palm Oil in huge markets like China and India, as they drive their requirements through
their supply chain', the future size of market for Certified Palm Oil is very uncertain. There is
therefore a high perception of risk on the smallholder's point of view when it comes to deciding
whether or not they should become certified.
I. D. 2) The size of the market for non-certified products
Because most of the palm oil produced is used in markets where sustainable palm oil is not a
requirement, most producers of palm oil do not feel concerned with certification.
They do not have direct incentives to achieve certification, because it is not likely that they will find a
mill willing to pay a price premium for it. These producers might be interested in implementing the
best agricultural practices that the RSPO promotes in order to increase their yield or the quality of
their fresh fruit bunch but the certification in itself has no direct benefit for them. Until the market
demand shifts, Certified Palm Oil will remain the exception and incentives for producers will remain
scarce.
4 PrioWaterhouseCoopers, "Palm Oil Plantation, Industry landscape, regulatory and finandal overview", PwC
Indonesia Publications (2012), page 6, last retrieved from the web on May 7 2013:
http://www.pwcom/id/en/pubications/assets/pahl -oil-plantation-2012.pdf
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"How long can we keep growers committed to evolving the sustainability agenda if demand [for
certified sustainable palm oil] does not increase"?", declared Darrel Webber, secretary general of the
RSPO on March 176 2013 in a British newspaper.
I. D. 3) The unsustainable financial burden of certification on independent
smallholders' shoulders
It is questionable whether or not the emergence of global standards in the palm oil supply chain will
affect the smallholders' competitiveness in the palm oil industry. This will be further discussed in
Chapter II.
Nonetheless, because the RSPO ambitions to 'make certified sustainable palm oil the norm', the
certification of smallholders should be made achievable. However, certification of independent
smallholders has been pointed out as not being sustainable as they have to bear a cost and a
responsibility that is often judged as too important and with little guarantee of paybacks.
The following statement summarizes this point very effectively: "Private standards like RSPO
effectively hand over the responsibility for sustainability (including environmental protection and
human rights issue) to the private sector where it is passed upstream along the value chain. This
discharges governments, lead firms and the international community from their liability regarding
sustainable development and puts the burden on the producers themselves as they are the ones who
have to comply with the standard (...) When smallholders have to take over this responsibility and
4 TheGrooer.o.uk, "Sustainable palm oil needs stronger market signals", (2013), last retrieved from the web on April
151 2013: http://www.thegroor.o.uk/opinion/letters/sustainable-palm-oil-needs-stronger-market-signals/237936
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the related duties, (...), it is questionable whether this development is in the spirit of a sustainability
initiative 5".
By putting this burden on smallholders' shoulders, the palm oil stakeholders are releasing a lot of
pressure on the most vulnerable actors of the value chain. This contributes to making the RSPO
certification unsustainable and perceived as risky for many producers.
I. D. 4) The tension between the expansion of the standard and its integrity
The RSPO aims at being an inclusive organization and at changing the market in order to make
"certified sustainable palm oil" the norm. This diffusion strategy, as well as the total absence of
discrimination when it comes to membership, has made the RSPO the target of severe criticism in
the past:
For example, the Rainforest Action Network , one of the RSPO's main critics, often blames the
RSPO of not taking corrective actions when it is obvious that its members are not fulfilling their
obligations". Other sources have also criticized the RSPO for being slow in responding to violations
of production standards (mainly peatlands clearance that emit a lot of C02 emissions).
However, the RSPO has been more reactive to these critics in the past few years, as the recent
example of illegal peatlands clearance in 2011 near Sampit in Indonesia's Central Kalimantan
province' illustrates. In this case, the RSPO reacted rapidly to a situation where one of its members
451:
Dallinger, J., "Oil palm Expansion in South East Asia: trends and implications for local communities and indigeneous
people - Chapter 1: Oil Palm Development in Thailand: eonomic, sodal and environmental considerations", Forest
Peoples Programme and SawitWatch report series (n*6) (2011), page 46
46 Rainforest Action Network Blog. "RSPO Missing Persons Report)> Rainforest Action Network Blog.", Web (2008),
last retrieved from the web on April 13t 2013: http://understory.ran.org/2011/11/22/ran-campaigner-goes-head-
to-head-with-malaysian-govemment-minister-at-rspo
47 Mongabay.om. "Alleged moratorium breadi becomes test for RSPO.", Egb (2011), last retrieved from the web on
Mardi 4th2013: http://news.mongabay.com/ 20 11/0623-rspo bread1 klk.html#RdsvUC5CP9bsOEfB.99
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had openly violated one of the RSPO Principles. The company in question had violated the second
principle of the RSPO (Compliance with applicable laws and regulations) by clearing peat forests
without securing the licenses required by the Indonesian govemment.
Managing the tension between sustainability and diffusion is a challenge the RSPO has to face, like
many certification agencies' have already been confronted to.
In this first chapter, we introduced the context that led to the emergence of the RSPO, identified the
impact of the RSPO standards on the main actors of the palm oil industry and presented the current
limitations of the RSPO. This will serve as a basis for the previous chapter which will focus on the
challenges certification implies for smallholders.
48 The Marine Stewardship Coundl or the FairTrade Comittee have also been exposed to severe aitidsms for the same
matter
33
Chapter II: Understanding the challenges posed by
certification from the smallholder's point of view
The cert ication smald is a hiallenge RPO10 his heen faced with since its found ation1 in
2004 ind the Roundtabhle Is still w\ orking on the improveent F the process to, date. Indeed. if the
RSO sCCIs to hiAVc foInd A Satisfying ceriition schcme for sniellholdes who ire contrIctuall
bonded to mills (,schlemed smallholders), thc Ro ndtable is still stlrgging On implemen fti ng
ceriI ticIti oII I 1 Ii I Ic smallders w Iai re i it bodi dc to nills co ntri c tu a lly
ViLous iictors siCI is a tirnited Acces tos i nancial resources and little aareness about newxx
tecni <es and best practices mike it difcult for it small holders to meet the RSPO
recquireiienits. This puts then it a disaidvantgc conm-pared to larger producers. In this chipter, wce will
eirst introduce the distinctioins thI t exist Amon the sillAllholders anid provide a thorugieh definitioi
for each type that are: the schee siallhodIcers, the as-sociatcd smaiullholders -And the indepcident
smIllhldcers (Part A). We wvi then review the Stanalards & Principles that hive been put i plice for
the scheme snallholders ind for the independent simallholders (Part B). I Living done this, wx e will
ainilyzc the main b)ttlenecks that exist todiy For the certincation of smillholders, in particular
AssociIted ind independent simnllhl(ders (PArt C. We will CevntLully ask the following question: do
smallholders really risk hecoming excuIided froc m the scuppi chain if thcy CanIIInIt access certification
(PI D)?
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II. A What are the different categories ofsmallholders and howcan we
apprehend the diversity of their situation and challenges?
II. A. 1) Understanding the diversity of smallholders
Regarding smallholders, the RSPO has developed a clear distinction between scheme and
independent smallholders. Another intermediary type of smallholders is the 'associated' smallholder.
Here are the characteristics of the three types of smallholders:
Independent smallholders: "In the context of RSPO systems, independent smallholders while very
varied in their situations are characterized by their:freedom to choose how to use their lands, which crops to
plant and how to manage them; being selforganiZe4, self-managed and self-financed; and by not being
contractually bound to anypard adar mill or anyparticular assiation. They may, however, receive support or
extension services from government agencies"."
If independent smallholders are, in theory, free to sell to any mill and thus able to negotiate higher
prices, reality is usually less appealing: they do not have guaranteed market access and they might not
have an important buyer base (and thus an important bargaining power) in the case mills are
scattered1 .
Scheme smallholders: "Scheme smallholders, while also very diverse, are characterised as
smallholders who are structurally bound by contract, by a credit agreement or by planning to a particular
mill. Scheme smallholders are often notfree to choose which crop they develop, are supervised in their
5 0 RSPO, "RSPO Prindples and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production: Guidano for Independent Smallholders
under Group Certification", RSPO Working Paper (2010)
5 1 The World Bank, FSG Soaal Impact Advisor, "Improvingthe Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector", IFC reports (2010), page 7
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planting and crop management techniques, and are often organized, supenised ordirectly managed by the
managers ofthe mill, estate or scheme to which they are structurally linked"".
Scheme smallholders are often referred to as 'plasma' smallholders in Indonesia. This shows how
incorporated to the mill scheme smallholders can be.
Figure 8 synthetizes the relative advantages and disadvantages for scheme and independent
smallholders.
Guaranteed market access
\ccess to inputs such as
planting materials and credit
Rapid access to new
technologies enabling high-
end productivitv
Can suffer over- dependence
on a single crop with price
volatility
Less flexibility in land use
and labour allocation
Hlierarchical and rigid
arrangements often limit
faimer decision- making
Free to seek highest prices
for fresh fruit bunches
Able to shift labour and
other inputs between palm
oil and other crops
depending on prices
Low costs of inputs
Risk that mill will not buy
Fresh Fruit Bunches
Reduced access (and risk
aversion) to credit and
technology
Often viewed as unreliable
by mills that purchase fresh
fruit bunches
Source: Tow ards Better Practice in smallholder palm oil production (2006)
Figure 8: Advantages and Disadvantages for independent and scheme smallholders3
s2 RSPO, "RSPO Principles and Critena for Sustainable Palm Oil Production: Guidane for Independent Smallholders
under Group Certification", RSPO Working Paper (2010)
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Independent smalholdersScheme smajlholders
Advantages
Disadvantages
L
Associated smallholders: Associated smallholders are the intermediate type of smallholders who do
not have any contractual obligations with the mill, have ownership on their land and decide what to
produce on it but who depend on a specific mill because it is the only mill they can sell their fresh
fruit bunches to.
This type of smallholders can be found in most countries in South-East Asia but are very common in
Papua New Guinea, because the situation of smallholders there is they often have one unique mill to
sell to. The definition" of associated smallholders given by the RSPO was actually created by the
RSPO Papua New Guinea Interpretaon Working Group.
s3 Venneulen, S., et al., "Towards Better practice in smallholder palm oil production", Natural Resource Issues Series
No. 5. International Institute for Environment and Development. (2006), page 28
s4 The Papua New Guinea National Interpretation Working Group has developed the following interim definition of
smallholders in the cuntry: "Associated smallholders retain legal authority over their land and farming systems dioice
without any mandatory or contractual obligations to the mill. In most cases the milling company represents the only
available FFB market. The milling company and the statutory extension service have a significant level of responsibility
for supporting and encouraging the smallholders in being able to meet RSPO requirements. Credit from financial
institutions and milling companies is unsecured and land cannot be forfeited for default on repayment or other non-
compliance" (rspo.or)
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II. A. 2) The weight of palm oil smallholders in the major
Percentage of
Plercentage of Akrea Pretg
Country Production under
under Smallholders
Smallholders
Indonesi'a 440 o 33%-
lavsia 410
N igeria -800%
PNG - Papua New Guinea 42% 0 35%)
T'hailand 76%
Source: Improving the livelihood of Palm oil smallholder (The World Bank, IFC
report) based on Teoh 2010 and Veneulen and Goad 2006
Figure 9: Weight of palm oil smallholders in the major producing countries3
The weight of palm oil smallholders (including scheme, associated and independent smallholders) in
production and land occupation is very high in the major producing countries. The smallholders are
an essential component of the supply chain and need to be included in the RSPO certification
process if the RSPO wants its vision to become a reality.
II. B Implementation of Principles and Criterias for the Certification of
Smallholders
II. B. 1) The importance of having specific Principles and Criterias for Smallholders
Since its creation, the RSPO has identified certification of smallholders as a challenging issue, as
Rikke Netterstrom mentioned during the interview I conducted with her. Because of the weight of
smallholders in terms of total production and of area cultivated, it is critical for the RSPO to tackle
the smallholder certification issue if they want to make Sustainable Palm Oil the norm
5 5 The World Bank, FSG Sodal Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector", IFC rorts. (2010), page 7
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producing countries
The RSPO recognizes that smallholders are a particular case and cannot be assimilated with the
bigger plantations. For this very reason, the RSPO developed specific guidance and indicators to
help smallholders become certified "to provide a workable and equitable means by which
smallholders can get their produce certified so they are not unfairly excluded from the emerging
market in RSPO -certified palm oil"".
In order to develop this special guidance and indicators, the RSPO's General Assembly created the
Task Force on Smallholders in 2005. The mandate of the Task Force was to "ascertain the suitability
of the RSPO Principles & Criteria for smallholders and make proposals on how best these can be
adjusted, nationally and/or generically, to ensure favorable smallholder involvement in SPO
production" ". In other terms, the Task Force was responsible for developing adjusted RSPO
standards for smallholders as well as for ensuring smallholders would be represented in the RSPO
process. The Task Force approved specific indicators and guidance for scheme smallholders and
independent smallholders respectively inJuly 2009 andJune 2010.
II. B. 2) The Principles and Criterias for smallholders: how are they different than the
ones for plantations?
After the Principles & Criterias implementation guidance for plantations were approved in 2007, it
took the RSPO two more years to develop the same for scheme Smallholders and an extra year to
develop those for independent smallholders, which are still in the phase of work in progress.
The principles and criteria developed for smallholders were made in the spirit of "simplification
without compromise", in Daniel May's words. This means that, in essence, the Criterias are the same
56 RSPO, "RSPO Prindples and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production: Guidanco on Scheme Smallholders",
RSPO Workin Paper (2009)
5 7 RSPO, "RSPO Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production: Guidance on Scheme Smallholders",
RSPO Working Paper (2009)
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as for estates but that the indicators and guidance were developed in order to facilitate their
implementation. This simplification has reduced the complexity of the procedures and decreased the
audit costs that the smallholderwould have to bear.
The experts I have interviewed listed the following examples of differences regarding independent
smallholder certification and estate certification: audit of High Conservation Value (requiring a
professional auditor for estates and not for smallholders) different rules for the use of pesticides or
fertilizers, and child labor. For the latter, one expert9 declared "You cannot tell independent
smallholders not to have their children help them out in the field. But we have some guidance about
what the children can do, safely. However, at the estate level, you'll have a total ban on child labor".
It seems that significant trade-offs have been made in order to make certification achievable to
independent smallholders. The example of allowing child labor is quite interesting, since it conflicts
with the common vision we have of sustainable and ethical practices. As many experts have pointed
out, banning child labor would not be realistic, given the existing practices. But we can ask ourselves:
isn't it the role of the RSPO to set high standards, or at least to provide a step by step guidance
towards better practices.
1I. B. 3) The future of smallholder certification: linking certification with livelihood
and daily life?
After the Criterias and Principles for scheme and independent smallholders were approved, the Task
Force for Smallholders was replaced in the middle of 2012 by the Smallholder Working Group. The
mandate of the Smallholder Working Group is "to ensure that smallholders improve their livelihoods
5 8 Based on the interview I anducted with Daniel May
59 Based on the interview I onducted with Rikke Netterstrom
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by benefitting from RSPO standards and best practices61". Petra Meekers is currently the Co- Chair
of the Smallholder working group and explained to me that the mandate of this newly created group
was extension of the work the the Taskforce started: "Our mandate is to look at the reality
smallholders are facing regarding certification and to work on making the standard to reflect and
integrate with the daily challenges of the smallholders. It has been recognized that the current
criterias are workable but that there needs to be a form of organized guidance for a successful
certification. And we see that if we want to increase the number of certified smallholders, we do have
to look at how best we can link the standard to the smallholder reality (...), create frameworks
whereby it is easier for smallholders to handle the initial steps of certification"".
This change of mandate gives a signal that the RSPO is now addressing the issue in a more holistic
way: it is no longer smallholder certification only that is discussed but the impact certification can
have on their livelihood and daily lives. We will see in chapter III that this is crucial to the success of
certification for smallholders.
However, a lot of progress needs to be done before making the business case that certification
increases livelihood. We will now look at the certification modalities for smallholders and identify the
main bottlenecks.
II. C Certification of smallholders: understanding the situations
II. C. 1) Certification of scheme smaliholders
For scheme smallholders: the certification fully depends on the mill they are contractually linked to.
There are two distinct situations:
6 Rspo.org. "Smallholders Working Group - Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil." (2011), last retrieved from the web
on 2 May 2013. : http://www.rspo.org/en/smallholders-woding-group
2 Based on the interview I anducted with Petra Meekers
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a) First option: The mill or plantation they are linked to wants to be RSPO certified.
If the mill is interested in becoming certified, it is their responsibility to ensure that the scheme
smallholders they are working with abide by the certification standards at most three years after the
mill has received the certification.
The RSPO decided that scheme smallholders should be assisted (technically and financially) by the
scheme manager: "As it is the mills which are seeking certification for the production from their
supply base and as the mills and associated estates have direct structural relations with the
smallholders on the schemes that supply them, the main responsibility for ensuring compliance with
this standard falls on 'scheme managers'. Such scheme managers will range from mill owners,
through nucleus estate managers to government agencies or even traders ".
The support provided by the mills or plantations to scheme smallholders is substantial.
We will study the case more in details in Chapter III but this is the kind of support New Britain Palm
Oil provided to 8000 smallholders they helped become certified in Papua New Guinea: "credit,
training, support and supervision in agricultural management techniques and sustainability64 ".
This gives us an idea of the type of investments, both in time and money, required to become
certified.
b) Second option: The mill or plantation they are linked to is not interested in RSPO
certification
If the mill is not interested in becoming certified, the certification process challenges are similar to
those encountered by independent smallholders. As we will develop in part II. D, abiding by the
standards without the support of extemal sources implies overcoming several bottlenecks.
63 RSPO, "RSPO Prindples and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production: Guidance on Sdieme Smallholders",
RSPO Working Paper (2009)
6 4 New Britain Palm Oil limited, "New Britain Palm Oil Sustainability Report 2010/11", NBPOL Sustainability report.
(2010)
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II. C. 2) Certification of independent smallholders
For independent smallholders, certification falls within their responsibility. "Independent
smallholders, who may sell their fresh fruit bunches either directly or through intermediaries to a
number of mills, are to be certified on their own6"".
The smallholders need to bear all the costs associated to the certification process. That is the reason
why the RSPO imposes that smallholders form groups in order to share the audit costs". "The
smallholders need to bear the cost of certification without benefiting from the guarantee that they
will access the markets that are ready to pay a premium for their fresh fruit bunches.
This is a very challenging situation where we see that:
-The bottlenecks to achieve certification are too imposing to be overcome by the smallholders on
their own (II. D)
-Smallholders risk being excluded from the value chain67 (II. E)
II. D What are the main bottlenecks preventing the certification of independent
smallholders?
The main bottlenecks I have identified for independent smallholder certification are (by order of
importance):
1) The lack of financial incentives
2) The high audit costs
3) The challenges related to the creation of Certification Groups
6s RSPO, "RSPO Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production: Guidance for Independent Smallholders
under Group Certification", RSPO Working Paper (2010),
66 RSPO, "RSPO Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production: Guidance for Independent Smallholders
under Group Certifiation", RSPO Working Paper (2010),
67 Wild Asia (Malaysia), "A review of Smallholder Oil Palm Production: Challenges and Opportunities for Enhaning
Sustainability. A Malaysian perspective", White Paper (2012)
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4) The difficulty to meet the requirements of the Principles & Criterias
5) The challenge related to traceability of their fresh fruit bunches
II. D 1) The lack of financial incentives
Today, the Palmgreen certificates are traded at a very low price that doesn't even cover for the audit
costs". It is therefore difficult for independent smallholders to see a direct financial benefit from
certification although, as we will see later, there are some significant indirect benefits that would
merit to be put more in emphasis.
Simon Siburat of Wilmar summarizes the challenges related to the incentives quite well:
"Certification is a new thing for them, so there's a variable reception. Some are very conducive and
see the benefit. Others don't. They'll see these costs eating into their profits, and ask, at the end of
the day, what will this do for me? We're hoping they'll get a premium out of this, but we can't answer
how much - because the market can't assure us69."
Because of the state of the market, it is very difficult for independent smallholders to believe that
certification will bring them interesting financial benefits. During the interviews I conducted with
several palm oil experts, my beliefwas confirmed: there is no direct financial incentive to date
deriving directly from RSPO certification and it is very hard to predict if there will be any in the near
future.
II. D. 2) The high audit costs
The audit costs to become certified can be a deterrent for independent smallholders.
The Taskforce on Smallholders has tackled this issue by designing the certification scheme for
independent smallholders as a group scheme: "As the costs of audits are likely to be too high for any
6 8 Based on the interview I onduCted with Daniel May
69 Te World Bank, FSG Social Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector", IFC reorts (2010), page 9
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one smallholder to afford, the Task Force on Smallholders and the Certification Working Group
have recommended that a Group Certification Protocol should be developed to allow independent
smallholders to share these costs'"". This recommendation is actually an obligation as the
certification scheme only allows for groups of smallholders to achieve certification, not independent
smallholders.
II. D 3) The challenges related to the creation of certification groups
According to the RSPO rules, independent smallholders can only be certified if they are part of a
group. From a financial point of view, the group system is the best system to follow. In Indonesia, it
has also been demonstrated that the formation of farmer cooperatives plays a significant role in the
increase of livelihood of farmers". However, this poses significant cultural challenges to independent
smallholders. For instance, some farmers have always been independent and do not see the interest
in becoming part of a group', as well as other challenges including "effective administration,
communication and ensuring fair representation of all members7"".
II. D. 4) The difficulty to meet the requirements of the Principles & Criterias
While plantations are already using agricultural and management best practices the RSPO Principles
require, smallholders are not readily able to meet those requirements". Therefore, smallholders need
to invest much more effort and time than plantations do in order to meet the criterias and prepare
for an audit.
70 RSPO, "RSPO Prindples and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production: Guidano for Independent Smallholders
under Group Certification", RSPO Working Paper (2010)
7 1 Rist, Lucy, Laurene Feintrenie, and Patrio Levang. "The Livelihood Impacts of Oil Palm: Smallholders in Indonesia."
Biodiversity and Conservation (2010)
72 Quote from an interview I conducted with Daniel May- "The difficulty [about group certification in Thailand] was to
convince the farmers who had been independent for 30 or 40 years to become part of a group of the interest of forming
a dub and losing their independence."
73 Wild Asia (Malaysia), A review of Smallholder Oil Palm Production, Challenges and Opportunities for Enhancing
Sustainability. A Malaysian perspective, White Paper. 2012
74 Dallinger, G., "Oil palm Expansion in South East Asia: trends and implications for local communities and indigeneous
people - Chapter 1: Oil Palm Development in Thailand: economic, soial and environmental considerations", Forest
Peoples Programme and SawitWatch report series (n*61. (2011)
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While scheme smallholders can benefit from the financial and technical support of the estate or mill
they work with, independent smallholders can only rely on themselves (and, in some contexts, the
government, as we will see in Chapter II): "With independent smallholders, they're nobody's child;
they're basically on their own"5", declares Simon Siburat of Wilmar, a Singaporean based agribusiness
company.
"Independent smallholders are often less productive [than scheme smallholders and plantations];
studies have identified elements of inefficiency that include maintaining old oil palms too long, using
smallholders' own (low-quality) seedlings, applying insufficient amounts of fertilizer, harvesting
unripe fresh fruit bunches, and not having strong data management systems76".
Implementing Sustainable Management Practices required for the RSPO certification is harder for
independent smallholders than for scheme smallholders because the level they are currently at is
lower. If we add the fact that they do not receive support from the mills or estates in most cases, we
understand how unfavorable their situation is with regards to achieving certification.
II. D. 5) The difficulty to trace the products
Another important characteristic of smallholders in the context of the overall palm oil industry is the
role of smallholders in certification. Several companies have become RSPO certified in recent years:
either achieving certification on a specific (segregated) portion of their supply, or by producing a
given amount of sustainable palm oil and receiving corresponding certificates ("book and claim").
Achieving full certification that includes all smallholders, however, poses significant challenges for
companies in terms of ongoing compliance - especially with independent smallholders. These
7 5 The World Bank, FSG Social Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector", IFC reports (2010), page 7
7 The World Bank, FSG Sodal Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector", IFC reorts (2010), page 7
46
challenges include the cost of monitoring compliance and the difficulty of ensuring traceability in a
shifting supply base'.
II. E Is the risk of independent smallholders' isolation from the value chain a
valid concern?
The concern of independent smallholders being excluded from the value chain is often addressed"
and, before looking at how we can make certification possible, it is important to understand what the
arguments in this debate are. There are usually two major uncertainties put forward in this debate
and we will bring some points of comparison with other certification process to try and enrich the
analysis.
I. E. 1) Risk n*1: certification could become a market requirement in the medium
run
Armetntagains: 'As long as there is a significant demand for non-certified palm oil, independent
smallholders will find mills that are ready to buy their fresh fruit bunches'. This argument has been
made by various experts in interviews conducted for this thesis. They didn't believe in the threat of
independent smallholders being excluded from the market, at least in the medium run.
Arument in favor: other experts have made the point that, as CSPO's market share increases,
independent smallholders will find it harder to find buyers and might eventually have to sell their
fresh fruit bunches at a discount. This could result in a significant loss in terms of revenue
opportunity and bargaining power.
What can we learn from other standards?
77 The World Bank, FSG Sodal Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector", IFC reports (2010), page 978 
"As global demand for 'certified sustainable palm oil' (CSPO) increases, these small farmers could find themselves
exduded from the global CSPO supply diain", in: Wild Asia (Malaysia), A review of Smallholder Oil Palm Production,
Challenges and Opportunities for Enhandng Sustainability. A Malaysian perspective, White Paper, 2012, page 5
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In 'Local Enterprises in the Global Economy7 9', the authors argue that, although the standard is
initially voluntary, compliance becomes necessary in certain markets, "either for competitive reasons
or as a consequence of regulatory demands". The standard therefore becomes a market requirement.
The paper focuses on the implementation of the ISO 9000 standards in Pakistan and demonstrates
that the of small firms chosen was able to successfully adopt these standards, thanks to the support
of extemal actors (institutions, extemal buyers) but also because they risked losing their biggest
market in the short-run, if they didn't. For palm oil smallholders, there is no immediate threat to lose
markets (or at least, smallholders will still be able to find a buyer that is within their perimeter). This
could be a risk because smallholders don't feel the urgency to act and when they realize they should
have taken the leap because certification will have become a market requirement, it could be too late.
In 'Global Value Chains', Gereffi points out the inherent challenges to having a gap between the
requirements for the domestic market and for the export market". Without coordination from the
buyers requiring high standards in production, it becomes a challenge for the supplier to satisfy the
buyer. This parallel is interesting because the demand for certified palm oil is negligible in palm oil
producing countries and the smallholders need to understand what is required from them in terms of
standards, without experiencing the need for it in their daily lives.
Risk n*1 could become a threat in the medium run for smallholders
It is this sense of urgency that the palm oil industry is lacking- for now, there are no tangible risks
(the demand for non-certified palm oil still dominates margely) in the short-run but I argue that,
79 Nadvi, Khalid. "The Effect of Global Standards on Loal Producers: A Pakistani Case Study." Ed. Hubert
Sdimitz.Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.:; Elgar, 2004. 297-325
80 Gereffi, G., et al., "The governance of global value chains", Review of International Politicd Economy 12:1 (2005). 78-
104
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slowly, in certain markets, certification will become a requirement and that some smallholders
serving these markets will have to become certified or find other buyers. These other buyers might
be harder to reach and might use their bargaining power to negotiate the price of the FFB at a
discount.
II. E. 2) Risk n*2: certification could entail losses in competitiveness for independent
smalIholders
Arguments ainst: the RSPO is working on making the implementation of Principles & Criterias
more accessible to the smallholders and announced that it would create a fund to help smallholders
finance the audit. This argument has been put forward by the RSPO and some interviewees.
Arguments in favor: certification of smallholders incurs operational and audit costs that smallholders
are not likely to recover if there revenue does not increase once they sell certified FFBs
What can we learn from other standards?
An interesting parallel can be made with the example of small firms in the leather industry in India. A
paper" by Tewari and Pillai states that these firms were able to comply with new stringent standards
without compromising their cost competitiveness. A major factor that enabled them to remain
competitive was the role of the Indian government who helped diffuse the standard and who created
a "negotiated collective actions2" towards collaboration between the public and private actors.
81 Tewar, Meenu, Poonam Pillai. "Global Standards and the Dynamics of Environmental Compliance in India's Leather
Industry." Oxfoid Development Studies., (2005): 245-67
82 Tewan, Meenu, Poonam Pillai. "Global Standards and the Dynamics of Environmental Compliance in India's Leather
Industry." Oxford Development Studies., (2005), page 248
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In the case of the Pakistani implementation of ISO 9000 written by Nadvi (cf. paragraphs above),
buyers were still more a-ressive in seeking lower prices" and certification did not provide any
improvements in their revenue. This is an interesting parallel for palm oil, given that the buyers are
very price sensitive and unwilling to pay a price premium for a commodity. It might well be the case
that buyers continue seeking the lowest price possible for palm oil, whether it be certified or not.
Risk n*2 could become a threat to the success of certification
Obtaining a price premium for 'certified sustainable palm oil' has proven difficult in the past years,
because buyers want a commodity like palm oil to remain cheap. On the other hand, large buyers
(such as Unilever) are committing to 100% CSPO by 2015 or 2020. Smallholders who decide to take
the leap of certification will very likely experience no increase in the price they receive for their FFB.
Because of the initial investment that certification represents for them, they will be worse off than if
they hadn't gone through the certification process and sold it to a buyer that didn't require the FFB
to meet the standards.
II. E. 3) The importance of smallholder certification after assessing the risks
Although some argue that these risks are negligible, they should be taken seriously. In the medium run, access
to certification should be made more accessible to smallholders because:
-Smallholders represent a significant percentage of the production in most producing countries
-The 'weakest'actors risk losing competitiveness and market access, while the 'strongest' will be able to thrive.
This is not compatible with the vision of the RSPO that consists in making the production more 'sustainable'
(Cf. part I. D. 3). We will see how this can be done in Chapter III and IV.
83 Nadvi, Khalid. "The Effect of Global Standards on Local Produers: A Pakistani Case Study." Ed. Hubert
Sdimitz.Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.:; Elgar, 2004. Page 319
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Chapter III: Solving the collective action problem related to
smallholder certification
Now tilat we havei highlghted he importance of smallholders' cerificaion in te midium- ru, we
wIl investigur te reaonls explain'ing why Io lttle itaivs have been sta~rted so far,
h\ this111 Ct we will introdc the tlc cfncept Cif olt c nIocn prol) m nd see how it can apply
to independet smalholder certificaio n(Part A). We wi then lk>ok It insiitiv ta iSomn aictoirs of
thec supply chain1 have unerce In order to gy beyond flhe statuqu. This1 Will ta ke flhe formn of
two case studies ro \hicl we wil extract the best practice ad ail yzC thi reasns of success
(Part B3" We willH then, sumI thei imn taJke 1Aay i h form1 ()f a tal beI( (Part C).
III. A) How does the collective action problem concept apply to certification of
palm oil smallholders?
"We no longer live in a society where responsibility for the way that agricultural commodities are
produced begins and ends with the growers4". It is unrealistic to assume that the burden of
certification should only be carried by independent smallholders. As we will see in this part, all the
actors of the value chain have a role to play and they could actually all benefit (directly or indirectly)
from smallholder certification.
III. A. 1) Introducing the concept of collective action problem
The certification of smallholders can be seen, to some extent, as a collective action problem': many
actors from the value chain would benefit from certification and the improvements they imply in
84 Persey, S., et al., "Towards Sustainable Palm Oil: a Framework for Action", Proforest report (2011)
87 Interesting definitions of ollective action problem can be found in these two papers:
(1) Ostrom, E., "Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action", Cambridge Univ. Press.
(1990), (2) May, D., Nielsen, T., "Tadding the Collective action Problem in palm oil production", (2011), The Nation: "A
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smallholders' performance, among which yield increase and quality improvement would be the most
obvious. However, the efforts and costs associated to the certification process are too high for a
single actor to undertake it alone. With little or no cooperation, nothing ends up being done,
although the opportunity costs are high (the opportunities associated to the certification of
smallholders).
The article summarized in Appendix 4 is about the Thai palm oil industry is very helpful in
understanding the collective action problem concept.
III. A. 2) The collective action problem developed in the context of independent
smallholder certification
Who are the actors in this collective action problem?
In this collective action problem, I have identified that the four main protagonists were:
(a) Retailers and Manufacturers who have publicly committed to source their palm oil from 'certified
Sustainable' sources,
(b) Millers who wish to have quality fresh fruit bunches, with a high OER (Oil Extraction Rate), and
produced in a way that respects the RSPO Standards & Principles (optional),
(c) Independent or Associated smallholders who want to increase their livelihood, and
(d) The government who is willing to increase production of palm oil in order to meet the global
demand and create more wealth inside the country, as well as to encourage the sustainable
development of the industry
collective action problem "describes a scenario in which a given problem an be solved only by collective, coordinated
and directed actions by a multitude of stakeholders simultaneously and in which the concerted action will initially be
detrimental to the participating individuals' short-tenn gain. The result is that collective interests am not realized"
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Why is it a collective action problem?
None of these actors has an incentive to invest alone in the certification of independent and
associated smallholders because it is too costly and their Return On Investment (ROI) is too low or
uncertain. However, we can argue that all of these actors would benefit directly or indirectly from the
certification of the independent and associated smallholders.
What is the situation for each stakeholder and what is the benefit they could get from
smallholder certification?
(a) Retailers andManufactures
A growing number of Retailers and Manufacturers have committed to source part or all of
their palm oil supplies from 'certified Sustainable' sources, as we have seen in chapter I. However,
the wide majority is not ready to integrate their supply chain, which would enable them to ensure
that the palm oil sources are being produced according to the RSPO Standards. Instead of
integrating their supply chain, they rely on mills for the certification of the palm oil. Therefore, mills
have to ensure that all the fresh fruit bunches they process has been produced according to the
RSPO Standards. Unilever, who is the Consumer Good Manufacturer that has shown the greatest
commitment towards sourcing its palm oil from sustainable sources, has simultaneously divested
from all the palm oil plantations it owned. Unilever had plantations in Ghana, Ivory Coast,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Malaysia and Thailand and therefore transferred the responsibility of
certification to the palm oil plantations88 -The press declaration of Patrick Cescau, then CEO of
8 Ghananews agency.org, "Unilever to divest interest in Benso, Twifo oil palm plantations", Web (2010), last retrieved
from the web on April 10th 2013: http://www.ghman sagency.org/details/Eaynomics/Unilever-to-divest-interest-in-
Benso-Twifo-oil-pal-plantaions/?d=3&ai=11949
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Unilever, is quite eloquent: "Suppliers need to move to meet the criteria, by getting certified both the
palm oil from their own plantations and the palm oil they buy from elsewhere8 9 "
When asked about the role manufacturers could play in terms of smallholder certification and
integration of palm oil in their own supply chain, Rikke Netterstrom, who has worked as a
consultant in evaluating the potential of a project with these components, replied:
"I am not saying that is impossible and I believe it can be done on a one-time basis but I am not
convinced it can ever be the driving force [in the industry]. I looked into it with a client company and
we basically came up to the conclusion that the complexity of the project and the upfront investment
for the retailerwould be far too big". So I believe it will be done only in a few niche markets. We
even had a producer who was willing to support it. So it can be done but I think it's a step too far in
the future. It's a nice dream".
The Retailers and Manufacturers would benefit from the inclusion of smallholders from a
CSR point of view (direct) and from a higher quality of the palm oil they source. But integrating
smallholders in their supply chain would require high investments in capacity building and
traceability, which would result in high costs to source palm oil, which they still consider as a
commodity, and are not willing to pay a price premium for.
If the responsibility was shared between them and the other three stakeholders identified above
(millers and plantations, smallholders and government), it is more likely that manufacturers would be
willing to act. But, in the absence of coordination and cooperation, they prefer to leave the responsibiity to the
plantations and millers to source their palm oil from sustainable sources.
89 Malaysian Palm Oil Board offidal website, "Unilever shifts Ivory Coast interest from palm oil to soap", Web (2008),
last retrieved from the web on May 12th 2013: http://bepLmpob.gov.my/news/detaiLphp?id=5139
90 Compared to the benefits derived from controlling its own sustainable palm oil supply diain (mainly brand image and
good reputation)
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(b) Millers and Plantations
Providing support to the independent smallholders they source their fresh fruit bunches
(FFBs) from can be challenging and extremely costly. The challenge comes from the fact that most
mills are not always able to trace the independent smallholders they source the FFBs from. This is
even more true when traders and middlemen collect the fruits from different smallholders without
segregation and then sell it to the mills, like it is common in Indonesia". And even when mills are
able to trace the smallholders they source their fruits from, the cost of capacity building required to
help smallholders become certified is extremely high.
When asked about the profitability of capacity building to help smallholders become certified, Rikke
Netterstrom replied: "The problem is that for the estate, [the retum they get from smallholder
certification] might not be enough for them to justify the absolutely humongous resource outlay
required. I mean it's fine for companies like NBPOL (cf. case study in III. B. 1)) who aims at being
fully traceable and sustainable but it's more problematic when you talk about those that are focused
on the ROL, who are probably never going to be 100% certified, leaving out small holders would be
a lot easier and a lot cheaper for them".
Millers and plantations would always benefit from better quality fresh fruit bunches and an
increasing number of them are also seek for fruits produced according to the RSPO standards. They
would directly benefit from smallholder certification. However, the certification of independent
smallholders is not a responsibility they are willing to take on their own, in most cases. The
independent smallholder is actually the last producer they will have certified if they choose to be
100% certified.
91 Based on the conversation I had with Rikke Netterstrom
55
Another option they have is to stop working with independent smallholders who are not certified,
provided they are able to source enough fresh fruit bunches to reach capacity92.
(c) Independent andAssodated smallbolders
As we have seen in Chapter II, there are many bottlenecks that prevent independent and
associated smallholders from becoming certified. They are not able, and most of the time not willing,
to make all the necessary investments to become certified because they cannot afford it or see
enough benefits that would justify the investment.
In the interview I conducted with a professional working for a large palm oil producer and
manufacturer, that professional explained that smallholders have a short-term approach when
assessing the benefits certification can offer. Although good agricultural practices that are associated
with certification have the potential for long term benefits to smallholders (such as increase in
yields), the short term costs outweigh these benefits in the smallholder's assessment. Indeed, the up-
front costs involved for both the certification process, as well as, operational changes' are the
elements that deter smallholders from achieving certification. The cost-benefit assessment is further
compounded by the relatively low price premiums to cover certification costs and uptake in the
"certified sustainable palm oil" market currently, which do not provide a significant short term
financial incentive for smallholders. "Smallholders are not yet able to afford or justify the short term
costs of certification given current market conditions, unlike larger companies that may have longer
term objectives related to market positioning and differentiation9". To date, certification does not
offer enough benefits in the short-run for it to be appealing to smallholders. However, using a long-
term perspective, certification can offer benefits that would justify the certification cost.
92 Based on interviews I had with several experts.
93 Operational dianges would indude, for example, the onstmction of new fadlities to store diemical pestiddes due to
environmental, safety or health oDncems.
94 Based on interview onducted with professional worling for a large palm oil producer and manufacturer
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In addition to this short-term vision, certification is a concept that is relatively new (and even
unknown) for most smallholders: "Certification is a new thing for them, so there's a variable
reception. Some are very conducive and see the benefit. Others don't. They'll see these costs eating
into their profits and ask, at the end of the day, whatwill this do for me? We're hoping they'll get a
premium out of this, but we can't answer how much - because the market can't assure us", declared
Simon Siburat from Wilmar"s.
Several reports, like the white paperwritten by Wild Asia", suggest that certification could
benefit smallholders both directly and indirectly in the long run. However, most smallholders are not
ready to make the investment (and most of the time, not able) without external support since the
investment is too important in comparison to the uncertain benefits in the short run.
(d) Governments
Some might argue that governments have a limited capability in helping independent
smallholders to become certified: they do not have the required knowledge to decide what is best for
the smallholders (cf. quote from Rikke Netterstrom in the paragraph below) and they cannot impose
the RSPO standards, given that they are based on a voluntary basis. However, governments have
many ways of influencing the palm oil value chain. For example, the "government can make
certification a licensing requirement, subsidize program participation, or promote participation
through their procurement policies or by applying program standards to their own practices
95 The World Bank, FSG Sodal Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sectoe, IFC rorts (2010)
96 Wild Asia (Malaysia), "A review of Smallholder Oil Palm Production: Challenges and Opportunities for Enhandng
Sustainability. A Malaysian perspective", White Paper (2012)
9 Espah, R., "When is Sustainable Forestry Sustainable? The Forest Stewardship Council in Argentina and Brazil",
Global Enviromnental Politics Volume 6. Number 2. May 2006 (2006), 55-84
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When asked about the role the government could play in helping smallholders achieve
certification, Rikke Netterstrom believed that it had an important role to play. But she also
emphasized the limitations of the government's intervention, if it was not supported by the private
actors: "There sure is a massive role to be played by government. However, on their own, without
channeling it through the producers, they don't stand a chance (...) they are entirely dependent on
implementation by estates. But financial assistance, technical assistance, or outreach assistance from
the government would be very helpful"".We will see in Chapter IV that these three components are
indeed critical to making certification accessible to smallholders.
It appears that governments could benefit from the certification of smallholders: the
implementation of best agricultural practices would yield to an increase in palm oil production, which
would increase the national production and the revenues they generate from taxes. It would decrease
the negative environmental impact of palm oil cultivation as well as potentially increase the
smallholder's livelihoods, both outcomes which they most certainly see as a positive.
The government of Indonesia has been the furthest on imposing standards on palm oil production:
in 2011, it set up the Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO), which consists in "guidance to
increase the global competitiveness of Indonesian palm oil whilst also bringing it under stricter
environmental legislation ". It is planned that the ISPO will become compulsory for all producers
by December 31 " 2014. The Indonesian government has set very high standards that all the
producers in the country will need to respect. Provided they offer enough guidance and support, the
certification gap will be easier to bridge for smallholders.
99 Based on an interview I acnducted with Rikke Netterstrom
100 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, "Palm Oil Plantation, Industry landscape, regulatory and finandal overview", bw
Indonesia 1eports (2012), page 6
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III. B. Two successful initiatives of actors from the supply chain that go
beyond the status quo
Now that we have explained that our challenge can be seen through the lens of a collective action
problem, we will study two cases where the actors have managed to overcome this problem. What
we will learn from these initiatives will provide us a first step to build our recommendations on
(Chapter IV).
We will study the most interesting initiatives that have been undertaken in order to facilitate the
certification of smallholders. The first initiative will focus on the example of a certification of 8,000
associated smallholders (supported by NBPOL). The second one will focus on the first successful
certification project involving independent smallholders (led by the GIZ).
III. B. 1) Certification of associated smallholders: New Britain Palm Oil Limited
a) A few elements ofintroduction
New Britain Palm Oil Limited (NBPOL) is a plantation company that operates in Papua New
Guinea and the Solomon Island. Its activities include "all aspects of palm oil plantation management,
seed production, mills, manufacturing of intermediate and consumer products4"'. The company is
very committed to sustainability and is engaged in having 100% of its supply chain of palm oil fully
traceable. For this purpose, NBPOL opened a refinery in Liverpool, U.K., in 2010 where it refines
certified and fully traceable sustainable palm oil. To date, 89% of the palm oil sales of NBPOL go to
Europe.
01 New Britain Palm Oil limited, "New Britain Palm Oil Sustainability Report 2010/11", NBPOL Sustainability report
(2010) introduction
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NBPOL has been "involved with the RSPO since its start 102". It is actually "a leading player in the
RSPO and has set ambitious targets regarding achieving full certification", according to an IFC
report1 .
Full certification meant working with the several thousand associated smallholders they source from
and help them become certified. NBPOL was publicly congratulated by the RSPO in 2010 for the
work it did with these smallholders. I had the chance to interview Petra Meekers, Group
Sustainability Manager of New Britain Palm Oil.
b) Context of the project
NBPOL processes 82% of Papua New Guinea's national production and sources more than 30% of
its fresh fruit bunches from smallholders. Deciding not to work with smallholders anymore (and
avoiding the effort it required to have them become certified) was not an option: "We realized that if
we were going to achieve certification, we needed to bring our smallholders with us. They're 30% of
our industry, we couldn't leave them behind0 4", declared Simon Lord, the Head of Sustainability for
NBPOL, in 2010.
NBPOL worked with these independent smallholders not only because of their inclusive strategy but
also because they needed them from a business point of view: it would have been very difficult for
them to make do without them, given that they represent 30% of their industry.
c) The challenges for NBPOL
1 New Britain Palm Oil Limited, "New Britain Palm Oil Sustainability Report 2010/11", NBPOL Sustainability report
(2010) page 3
103 The World Bank, FSG Social Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Secto?', IFC reports (2010), page 11
104The World Bank, FSG Social Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector", IFC reorts (2010)
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Addressing a large number of associated smallholders. In total, NBPOL was working with about
13,500 smallholders in 2010:7 500 smallholders were long-term partners and 8 000 smallholders had
just become part of NBPOL's supply chain, after the company acquired 3 important plantations
from Cargill. These smallholders were mainly associated.
Motivating smallholders to increase their productivity. While NBPOL's estates produced 26 tons per
hectare on average and the long-term smallholders of NBPOL produced 19 tons per hectare on
average, the newly incoming smallholders (from Cargill's acquisition) had a yield of about 5 tons per
hectare. There was a lot of progress to make for them in terms of productivity 0 5 . According to Petra
Meekers, the incoming smallholders were based in a difficult region that had been affected by natural
disasters and where smallholders were not interested in harvesting their block. NBPOL overcame
these resistances and helped these smallholders to significantly increase their yields.
d) Reasons of success ofNBPOL
NBPOL deployed a lot of efforts in order to help both its historical and newly incoming
smallholders to become certified.
1 S reason of success: understanding the smallholder's situation
New Britain Palm Oil started by surveying its smallholders to check on some agricultural and social
indicators that would tell them what the situation was. Based on the results of the survey, they
identified the areas in which their smallholders scored well and those where they scored poorly and
were able to define a roadmap for every specific region or group of smallholders. For example, they
looked at where improvements were needed, where awareness needed to be created, what trainings
were required, etc.
105 The World Bank, FSG Sodal Impact Advisor, "Improving the livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector", IFC reorts. (2010), page 12
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2 nd reason of success: creating awareness around certification
NBPOL worked extensively on creating awareness about certification, environmental practices and
price premium. The company diffuses weekly radio programs on provincial radio channels in order
to create awareness, according to Petra Meekers.
3' reason of success: investing in capacity building
NBPOL provided technical assistance and extension" " services to the smallholders, after identifying
the areas of weakness through surveys.
In its 2010 /11 sustainability report describing the capacity building of the incoming smallholders,
NBPOL declared: "We developed an innovative and participatory approach, providing credit,
training, support and supervision in agricultural management techniques and sustainability. The
project will also involve replanting of close to 5,000 hectares' 07" .
The investments were significant and NBPOL is committed to continue "providing the technical,
financial, and material support0 "" until smallholders reach a satisfying level of yield and profitability,
being in line with RSPO's Principle n*8 which is "Commitment to continuous improvement in key
areas of activity".
4* reason of success: developing partnerships with the smallholders
NBPOL has developed a partnership relationship with their smallholders. This trust relationship has
enabled the certification process to go smoothly.
106 "Extension allows for better agricultural practics to be disseminated to smallholders who may not have technical
agronomic knowledge or specific experienco with palm oil (...) sucessful extension sets the ground for a ertified crop."
(NBPOL Sustainability report 2010/2011)
1 New Britain Palm Oil Limited, "New Britain Palm Oil Sustainability Report 2010/11", NBPOL Sustainability report
(2010)
08 Nidc Thompson,'CEO Welcome' in New Britain Palm Oil Limited, "New Britain Palm Oil Sustainability Report
2010/11", NBPOL Sustainability report, (2010), page 3
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"None of NBPOL's smallholders are under contract to supply fruit but instead the company
develops partnerships (...) Seeing and treating smallholders as partners and supporting them has
allowed a healthy relationship to be established which mitigates potential disruptions from single
smallholders***".
5* reason of success: ensuring a minimum price premium to keep smallholders motivated
In 2011, the price premium associated to Greenpalm certificates dropped from USD 10 to less than
one dollar per ton. NBPOL decided to set a minimum price premium for the Greenpalm certificates
in order to keep its smallholders motivated.
e) Conclusion:
"NBPOL was the first company in the world to certify all of its smallholders. Unlike many
companies that have yet to certify 100% of their fruit base and mix certified and uncertified fruit at
the start of their supply chain, all fruit entering our NBPOL mills is certified and segregated"*".
This 100% certification goal was motivated by the will to become fully traceable. This and NBPOL's
commitment to smallholders made the certification of these associated smallholders a success.
III. B. 2) Certification of independent smallholders: the GIZ's project involving 412
independent smallholders in Thailand
This project led by the GIZ has been the only successful case regarding independent smallholder
certification so far. Understanding how the GIZ overcame the difficulties is a great source of
leaming for my research. In addition to this, the project has proven to yield important benefits for
109 Simon Lord interviewed in October 2012, Sustainablepalmoil.org, "New Britain Palm Oil Limited Case study", Web,
last retrieved from the Web on April 11th 2013: http://www.sustainablepalmoil.org/refineies -
manufacturers/refineries/ case -studies/new-britain-palm-oil-limited
1 Simon Lord interviewed in October 2012, Sustainablepalmoil.org, "New Britain Palm Oil limited Case study", Web,
last retrieved from the Web on April 11th 2013: http://www.sustainablepalmoil.org/refmeries-
manufacturers/refineries/ aise -studies/new-britain-palm -oil-limited
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the smallholders and provide an encouraging business case. After studying this project, we can then
identify best practices that can be transposed to other projects in Thailand and, eventually, other
countries in South East Asia.
a) A few elements of introduction
The German International Cooperation (GIZ) is a development organization that promotes
sustainable development worldwide. The GIZ initiated a program in Thailand where it provided
technical and financial support to help 412 independent smallholders become certified. I had the
chance to interview Daniel May, who coordinated the project for the GIZ.
b) Context of the project
The program was funded by the German government (3,5 million euros), that was looking at
sponsoring a project that would help smallholders in the palm oil industry become certified in 2008,
when there was a lot of controversy around palm oil and the increase in food prices.
The project lasted almost 4 years and ended in July 2012, when 412 smallholders successfully
received the RSPO certification.
c) The challenges for the GIZ
Talking about benefits that go beyond certification. Daniel May and his team realized very early in
the project that smallholders were not interested in certification or sustainability in itself. For
example, they asked questions like: 'what is the interest I have in becoming certified?'; 'what is the
price premium?'.
The project coordinators soon had to review their argumentation and decided to communicate about
the other benefits than certification in itself. "When asked how farmers would benefit most from the
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cooperation, they replied that they were interested in learning about farm management, fertilizer
management, harvesting management1 l". From then on, GIZ decided to focus on these issues rather
than certification and sustainability-related issues that didn't generate a lot of attention among the
smallholders. This shift contributed significantly to their success.
d) Reasons of success of the GIZ
1 ' reason of success: Providing best agrcultural practices knowledge to farmers
The first step GIZ identified was to provide farmers with agriculture knowledge. Fertilizer, water,
pesticide, or harvesting management, were topics they were particularly interested in learning more.
The objective was to increase the yield of their farms.
2 nd reason of success: Establishing a durable and interdependent relationship between the mill and
the farmers
Several mills showed a willingness to pay a price premium for higher fresh fruit bunches with higher
Oil content (called Oil Extraction Rate, or OER, in the industry). This financial incentive therefore
further encouraged farmers to increase the quality of their fresh fruit bunches and to develop
partnerships with interested mills.
3' reason of success: Finding buyers for certified palm oil to incentivize farmers
The mills in the area of intervention were not seeking certification and therefore didn't care whether
or not the FFB respected the RSPO standards. The smallholders mainly sold their FFB for domestic
use and felt the Greenpalm certificate scheme would not benefit them either. Therefore, certification
in itself was not appealing to the farmers as it would incur audit costs and additional operational
costs with no guarantees of increase in revenue.
According to Daniel May, who worked directly with these smallholders
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The GIZ had to find buyers who would be interested in buying sustainable palm oil. They discussed
with Shell Thailand who showed interest in buying sustainable palm oil in the long-run (once mills in
Thailand become certified) as well as Johnson & Johnson willing to buy certificates at an above-
market price. Finding potential buyers who were willing to pay a price premium for certified FFBs
was crucial in the success of the certification project.
4' reason of success: creating a s.tong business case and a positive roup dynamic
According to Daniel May, the 412 smallholders benefited from a 1,1 million euro yearly income
increase that can be broken in two: A million euros came from the mill (for the quality of the fruits)
and 100,000 euros came from the sale of Greenpalm certificates.
The extra income from the certificates is money that belongs to the community. They have
reinvested this money in additional staff that works on the documentation; they are organizing
trainings, and have also started to bargain as a group with the fertilizer suppliers. "They are taking
collective action to achieve something together", declared Daniel May.
e) Conclusion:
The benefits for smallholders were significant: they accessed technical advice and support, increased
their productivity and the quality of their FFBs, which in turn significantly increased their income. In
addition to this, they derived several agro-ecological benefits from the sustainable management
practices they put in place" 2".
Figure 9 summarizes the impacts and economic added value for smallholders and mills.
m Wild Asia (Malaysia), "A review of Smallholder Oil Palm Produdion: Challenges and Opportunities for Enhanding
Sustainability. A Malaysian perspective", White Paper (2012)
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10-1 5'o reduction in fertilizer costs
Impact Yield increased 3 ton/hectare
0.1 additional Thai Baht per kg of Fresh fruit Bunch
Revenue increase 3000 USD/year per smallholder (approximately)Economic Value Added
1-2' o Oil Extraction Rate increased for mill
Soure: RT9 presentation by Dr. Kukeavkasm, GIZ Project on Sustainable Palm Oil Production in Thauland (2011)
Figure 10: Summarized benefits of the GIZ Project
The results of this certification project are very impressive. The Return on Investment is huge, if we
compare the Initial Investment (approximately 3,5 million dollars) to the extra income the 412
smallholders were able to generate collectively (approximately 1,1 millon dollars). However,
replicating this project requires high initial investments and overcoming the collective action
problem"3 is a key challenge.
III. C Take away from these case studies and limitations
III. C. 1) Take aways from these two case studies
Several key factors explain the success of this program. Figure 11 synthetizes these factors of success
and puts them in perspective with the bottlenecks identified in Chapter II.
113 "In this project everybody benefits, particularly fanners and mills, but downstream industries and the government as
well. Solutions for improving the palm oil sector are available, but investments primarily in apacity building are required
and must be financed. Due to increased incomes for all stakeholders, such investment will pay offl" (May, D., Nielsen,
T., "Tadding the Collective action Problem in palm oil production", (2011), The Nation
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Bottleneck addressed (as
identified in Chapter II) GIZ NBPOL
1) The lack of financial The farmers found other NBPOL ensured its
benefits than certification smallholders with a fair
incentives alone price for their FFB
The identification of buyers
of certified FFBs was a
determinant factor in -
convincing smallholders to
become certified
2) The high audit costs In both cases, the smallholders didn't have to pay the
The GIZ created a favorable
3) The challenges related to the dynamic in the group and
creation of Certification Groups encouraged solidarity and
mutual help
4) The difficulty to meet the Guidance was provided by NBPOL worked extensively
requirements of the Principles & both actors to the on creating awareness on
Criterias smallholders certification
The GLZ provided best Efforts on extension were a
agricultural practice determinant factor in
knowledge to the achieving certification
smallholders
The certification was made
possible by important
investments in capacity
building
A need for a mutually Not Applicable (NBPOL
beneficial partnership
5) The challenge related to beteen te s he has an integrated suply
traceability of their fresh fruit . chain already and produces
bunchessmallholders was identified almost 100% certified palm
as a necessary condition to oil)
success
Figure 11: Factors of success of each project - addressing the bottlenecks identified in Chapter II
II. C. 2) Limitations to the case studies
As some experts have pointed out during two interviews, the example of NBPOL might not easy to
replicate in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia" 4. However, Petra Meekers pointed out that "the
1 4 Experts argue that the situation in Papua New Guinea is exceptional and different from that of Malaysia and
Indonesia (different type of smallholder, freedom to dioose whidi crop to cultivate vs. obligation by the state, etc)
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system can be extended to a lot of countries and we have received recognition from various
governments that our system was interesting for them"".
On a similar note, Daniel May mentioned during our interview that Thailand had been chosen for
the pilot because smallholders represented 8 0% of the producers and had interesting characteristics.
It was estimated that it "could be a little bit easier compared to other countries in South East
Asia" 6". However, the case of the GIZ is cited extensively as the first large scale certification
program for independent smallholders and as an example to follow.
Both these case studies will give us a good ground basis to start Chapter IV where we will discuss
about the necessary conditions and recommendations to ease the certification process for
independent and associated smallholders.
5 Based on the interview I conducted with Petra Meekers, Group Sustainability Manager at NBPOL
16 Based on the interview I conducted with Daniel May, project cordinator at the GIZ
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Chapter IV: Necessary conditions to make certification
accessible to independent smallholders and
recommendations
I hs cha ttr will be composed cf three parts: inhe nrs one (Part A\, ll lis it three nccsslry
conditions h hvI idtcied after nthetizing the reseairci h nd ite ries ACc fortC is
In tilt. co par1, w wil idtify best practi ces to mee thi' nccessary ciions. Thes t
pc ice il bc srllUcci fromi exp(e i'qrts' dic, \. ic' oItlve Pc iCC the iii cpalmI il inidustn an)d othcr
certncain pOCesses that mighIt haveN ( been confrted- to s111imilar1 issues. W \N 1 wi ropol-se
reco rnmndedic solutions', kepngi mind thiat the se soluitlins mighta require'C adapta"tionls "Mamon
co tetsan cutrien s (PaIrt 13'.
At 1the end~ of he cha('pter, w-e will reogiz th]imI1Titain ofI theseic ( recomt)mendaictf1iions and discuss
!henee for I urthecr resch (Par Cd i -)
IV. A Necessary conditions to make certification beneficial for independent
smallholders
In the previous chapters, we have identified the main challenges RSPO was faced with (Chapter1),
the bottlenecks for independent and associated smallholders' certification (Chapter II) and we have
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studied two cases of successful certification of independent and associated smallholders (Chapter
III).
Following these steps, three necessary conditions have been identified for the creation of benefits in
the certification process of smallholders:
-Capacity building of smallholders (1)
-Guarantee of market incentives for certification (2)
-Accessibility of the certification process (audit and maintenance) (3)
These necessary conditions are explained below:
IV. A. 1) Is necessary condition: capacity building of smallholders to reach the level
of requirements
To achieve certification, smallholders need to implement the Principles & Criterias, to develop
sustainable agricultural practices, and to become part of a group.
These two latter components are often seen as 'benefits' of certification but it is more accurate to see
them as causes of certification. Indeed, certification is simply a recognition for these good practices
that have been achieved through improvement efforts.
In order to achieve those three components and become certified, associated and independent
smallholders, and the related stakeholders need to invest a lot in capacity building.
IV. A. 1) 2n1d necessary condition: create incentives for certification
It is often argued that independent smallholders obtain many benefits from the productivity increase,
the adoption of sustainable practices and sometimes the change in organization structure (formation
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of groups). As we have just mentioned in the previous paragraphs, achieving these three components
is a cause of certification, not just a consequence. This observation leads to the following question:
once smallholders have succeeded in these three components, what is their incentive to become
certified?
Smallholders need to find incentives to go through the first audit process and maintain their level
over the years. Market access can be a good incentive in itself, provided the only buyers within reach
for smallholders require certified fresh fruit bunches. Certification thus becomes a requirement and
the smallholder is incentivized to achieve it. But if there are alternatives and all other conditions
remain equal, a smallholder, no matter how close he or she is to certification, will have no incentive
to become certified. And that is because the smallholder will always have the option to sell to a mill
that does not require certification. As Daniel May from the GIZ declared during our interview, there
is a need to "create benefits that go beyond sustainability"". Above all, smallholders are sensitive to
the "cost versus benefit"" implications of certification.
As long as the demand for 'certified sustainable palm oil' remains the exception rather than the
norm, other forms of financial incentives need to be found to motivate smallholders to achieve
certification.
IV. A. 3) 3rd necessary condition: accessibility of the certification process
Once smallholders meet the requirements and find an incentive to become certified, the
implementation and audit costs related to certification should not be deterrents.
"7 Based on the interview I conducted with Daniel May
118 Cashore, B., et al., "Governing throughmarkets: Forest certification and the emergence of Non-State Authority",
New Haven: Yale University Press (2004), Print
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Because independent smallholders (and associated smallholders, to a lesser extent) are "nobody's
child"9'", they cannot always rely on the support of greater organizations to become certified. The
certification process needs to me made accessible to them along the whole process: initially (by
providing access to financial support and to information) as well as on the long-run (by enabling
them to maintain the level of requirements over the years).
IV. B. Solutions to meet the three necessary conditions
IV B. 1) Capacity building of smallholders
The best practices for capacity building I have identified are:
a) To provide smallholders with access to training and information
b) To give smallholders a better access to financial services
c) To empower the certification group to become a business unit
A) P1rov1ide smallhiolders wihaccess to tralinin-g and informion01
In the beginning of the program, the smallholders who worked with the GIZ requested training on
good agricultural practices (fertilizer, pesticide, yield management, etc.) Because independent
smallholders have such a low yield compared to plantations, improving their agricultural practices is a
priority, as well as a 'low hanging fruit'.
"The current low yields achieved by independent small farmers provide an exceptional opportunity
to significantly increase the production of CSPO from the existing planted area. With appropriate
119 The World Bank, FSG Social Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smaliholders: the Role of the
Private Sector", IFC reorts. (2010), page 7
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technical support, training, extension support and management, smallholder production has the
potential to reach similar levels of production as the larger estates "'
A better dissemination of information is also necessary. Auditors from SAI Global Indonesia
recommended during a presentation at the 10* Roundtable (2012) that the RSPO provide "improved
dissemination of the requirements 21" among the actors of the supply chain. The RSPO requirements
should be accessible and better explained to producers, so that they can make their management
choices in an educated way.
Possible solution to explore: Create local centers of Excellence
Daniel May suggested that a way to give smallholders access to training and information would be to
create Centers of Excellence. These centers of excellence would be a knowledge and training hub at
the local level and could be funded by various stakeholders: the group of smallholders (this is
happening in the case of the GIZ Project, although they do not call it officially 'Center of
Excellence'), the millers, the traders, govemment institutions, etc.
Such Excellence Centers have been developed for other crops, such as cocoa or timber, and include
various services ranging from training on agricultural best practices, nurseries "2, financial literacy, etc.
They have proven to be particularly appreciated by farmers, who can refer to it as a knowledge
center.
Wild Asia (Malaysia), "A review of Smallholder Oil Palm Production: Challenges and Opportunities for Enhancing
Sustainability. A Malaysian perspective", White Paper (2012)
m SAI Global, "Challenges and Limitations of RSPO Program Audi: a review based on auditing experiences of SAI
Global Indonesia", SAI Global presentation at at RT10 (2012)
m Vermeulen, S., et al., "Towards Better practice in smallholder palm oil production", Natural Resource Issues Series
No. 5. International Institute for Environment and Development. (2006)
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), (ive smlrllholders a 1)ctter ACCCSs to fiLnncial services
Access to credit is an ongoing challenge for independent smallholders. Garry Smith, from the FAO
declares: "Access to credit is a cross -cutting issue that's critical. Farmers don't have registered assets
against which they can borrow, and the financial system will only lend against unreasonable collateral
requirements, not on cash flow. It hamstrings smallholder farmers "". Smallholders need access to
credit for initial investments (land acquisition, clearing, planting) as well as for ongoing in puts
(fertilizer and other inputs over the lifetime of the crop).
The need for credit is even higher when smallholders want to achieve certification: bridging the gap
between their practices and those required in order to qualify for certification requires an additional
investment. Among many more, investment in fertilizer, pesticide, replanting of trees are the most
frequently cited. With little or no access to credit, smallholders are not able to proceed to those
changes.
Palm oil smallholders also need specific credit terms: "the delay in the productive lifecycle of oil
palm also means that these initial loans must be structured to allow deferred repayment"".
Possible solution to explore: Support access to credit and improve loan terms
Several actors could help smallholders to access credit: plantations, donors, local banks,
governments, etc.
A report from the International Finance Corporation, sees opportunities for both the private sector
and international donors: Plantations could offer "support to smallholder efforts to obtain credit, via
either direct credit or by guaranteeing loans from local banks" while donors could "provide capital to
m The World Bank, FSG Sodal Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector', IFC reports (2010)
The World Bank, FSG Social Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smailholders: the Role of the
Private Sectoe', IFC eorts (2010), page 14
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promote lending to smallholders, whether through support to plantation companies or by
capitalizing banks and microfinance institutions that are providing credit to the sector"".
Regarding the specific credit terms, local banks and governments could provide support in creating
flexible loan terms (banks) and in providing cross-sectorial government subsidized scheme. The
latter has already been offered by the Indonesian government"2, whom we have seen is well in
advance in terms of providing support to its producers. In India and Bangladesh, local banks and
microfinance institutions have developed a wide array of flexible loan terms and this model could be
replicated in other South East Asian countries for palm oil producers.
c) rnower the, certificaition g~ru tobcm uiesuit
Independent smallholders can only become certified if they become part of a group. Therefore,
overcoming the reluctance of some members who want to remain independent and creating a good
dynamic in a group is critical in order to achieve certification. Smallholders in the GIZ project
provide us with an excellent example of best practice:
us The Wodd Bank, FSG Social Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector', IFC reports (2010)
126 Veneulen, S., et al., "Towards Better practice in smallholder palm oil production", Natural Resoure Issues Series
No. 5. International Institute for Environment and Development, (2006)
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Daniel May talking about his experience with group certification of smallholders in
Thailand (cf case study in Chapter II):
"The difficulty came from the fact that we had to convince the farmers who had been
independent for 30 or 40 years to become part of a group. On the one hand, we forced them a
little bit, because we told them that they had to be a group in order to receive any service from
GIZ. Only ten farmers left the groups in the process and the remaining 412 members were
satisfied in the end when they saw the individual benefits they could receive from it. Getting
them together and creating the idea of a club and collaboration took a while but I think, in the
end, all of them are quite committed to it.
Actually, they started to do the documentation to track the yield they have, how much they
produce per hectare. And after a while, they start identifying who has the highest yield, or the
best quality and then they start to build internal trainings. The best farmers were inviting their
neighbors to tell them how they do this. Today, everyone sees benefits in collaborating within a
group."
The GIZ smallholders have formed a 'cooperative' group that is empowered to improve their
livelihood through internal trainings and the reinvestment of their profit in capacity building (cf. case
study in Chapter II). The GIZ initially 'forced' them to do so but they are now independently
managing their group as a business. They offer a great example of best practice.
Possible solution to explore: Empower groups and cooperatives to become a business
As Simon Winter from Technoserve declared in an interview, organizing smallholders in groups is
key to improving their productivity and sustainability: "The first question is how to give smallholders
bargaining power - if you're independent, you're not going to get a decent deal with the buyer. But
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even if you're organized, you face general challenges of farmer groups: you need to run the group as
a business'".
The system Fedepalma has put in place offers a good example of what has been done in the field of
empowering communities. Indeed, the national federation of palm oil growers (Fedepalma) in
Colombia has been promoting the formation of smallholder alliances over the last 15 years. The
alliances consist of a central mill operator and local smallholders that organize into a productive unit.
Fedepalma, along with the mill operator, typically provide technical training to these smallholders.
But it also provides trainings to develop organization and management skills: "There's a lot of
training needed on how to run a cooperative, on understanding that getting organized is useful'"",
declares Jens Mesa-Dishington, President of Fedepalma. These alliances have had, at least, four
positive outcomes: (1) The alliance can be used as a platform to deliver training for smallhol ders
efficiently; (2) Economies of scale are made, both for smallholders and for the operating mill; (3) The
alliance has helped in promoting social development in the area; (4) The smallholders and mills have
developed new attitudes, especially in the case where smallholders have been able to buy stock from
mill operators. In the latter case, smallholder's attitude has been transformed: "they're ready to put in
all the effort to protect the business", according to Jens Mesa-Dishington.
Empowering farmer groups to start a collaboration and even a business has proven to be very
fruitful. One idea could be to link those group to a Center of Excellence where they could organize
trainings, inquire information, access to inputs at a negotiated group price, etc.
IV. B. 2) Provide market incentives of certification
m The World Bank, FSG Sodal Impact Advisor, "Improvmg the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector", IFC reports (2010)
1 The World Bank, FSG Social Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector", IFC rports (2010)
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Best practices in order to create market incentives are:
a) To create financial incentives for certification
b) To create partnerships with mills
c) To find buyers for the Greenpalm certificates and to agree on a satisfying price for both parties
a) Create financial incentives for certication
Creating benefits that go beyond certification was something that the GIZ did very well: they
provided training and capacity building to farmers (cf. necessary condition n*1) and created favorable
market terms for farmers to receive positive financial returns out of certification. Farmers have a
cost-benefit analysis approach when they weigh whether or not they should become certified. What
is said in the following quote about forest certification applies very well to palm oil: "A key lesson
that emerges from our story regarding the use of non-state market-driven governance systems is that
forest companies and forest owners must perceive a direct or indirect economic benefit. This rather
intuitive statement, widely supported by our cases, has enormous consequences. A non-state market-
driven system cannot create standards that are so high that the potential benefits in support are
outweighed by the costs of implementation".
Just as it is the case of Forest Certification, it is clear that smallholders need to perceive higher
benefits than costs before they decide to become certified.
m Cashore, B., et al., "Governing through markets: Forest certification and the emergence of Non -State Authority",
New Haven: Yale University Press (2004), Print
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Possible solutions to explore: There are two possible solution to explore - (1) creating
partnerships with mills (point b below) that will guarantee market access for smallholders and -(2)
finding buyers of Greenpalm certificate (point c below)
b) (Creatc pirtnerhips \vith mills
Creating partnerships with mills has been a determinant factor in the GIZ project. Solving the
prisoner's dilemma described below is a key element of success for independent and associated
smallholders' empowerment and success towards certification.
The prisoner's dilemma applied to the relationship between mill and independent
smallholders
(Collaborate, Collaborate) would generate the greatest returns for both actors: The Mills
invest in smallholders (eg. capacity building, trainings and assistance in becoming certified)
and smallholders commit to selling their high quality FFBs to the mills.
However, the mills fear that the smallholders will defect. Investing in the smallholders
requires upfront investments. If the mill helps them and the smallholders sell to competitors,
the mill loses its investment and helps its competitors.
Similarly, the smallholder fears that the mill will defect: If they commit to selling to one mill,
they lose the bargaining power they usually have and might not receive a fair price. Their
efforts will have been vain.
Even though collaboration yields the highest payback, the players are more likely to defect, if
they is not a strong trust relationship between them.
The mill and smallholder are playing a prisoner's game that only trust and reciprocation can solve.
Otherwise, as Elinor Ostromwrote about solving collective action problems: "If participants fear
that others are going to take advantage of them, no one will wish to initiate costly actions only to
find that others are not reciprocating"".
13 0 Ostrom, E, "Collective action and property lights for sustainable development", 2020 Vision, Focus 11, 2 (2004)
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Possible solution to explore: Solve the prisoner's dilemma by creating partnerships or trust
relationships between independent smallholders and mills
Overcoming the prisoner's dilemma can be done in several ways. I found the following elements
particularly helpful in the case of our study:
-Creating a new incentive structure: As we have seen in the case of the GIZ, mills have committed to
pay a higher price for higher quality FFBs. There is an incentive for smallholders to produce higher
quality because they will be rewarded for their effort, while the mill can be reassured the smallholders
will sell to them if they offer a premium that is competitive enough.
-Creating interdependencies between mills and the smallholders: such interdependencies would lower
the probability of defect by each party. For example, mills could provide advantageous loan terms to
smallholders who commit to selling their FFBs. Both parties would be incentivized to cooperate
because they would be interdependent.
-Engaging in reciprocal relationship on the long-run: ongoing repeated games with a prisoner's
dilemma framework can prevent players from defecting if they see value in maintaining a long-term
trust relationship. For example, if mills can guarantee smallholders access to markets and solve their
transportation challenge (i.e. getting their FFBs to the mill within 24 hours post-harvest) on the long-
run, it is more likely that smallholders will collaborate.
Simon Lord, from NBPOL, mentioned the quality of the roads as a sign from mills that "they care
and are concerned about forming true partnerships" with their smallholders. These kind of long-
term commitments, no matter how trivial they can seem, are critical in building a trust relationship
between mills and smallholders.
81
When possible, mills and smallholders need to define tighter relationships to overcome the prisoner's
dilemma. This is easier to do in the case of associated smallholders, because they have a tacit
exclusive relationship with the mills. Therefore, it is critical for the independent smallholders to
engage in such trust relationship and to demonstrate goodwill and reciprocity if they want mills to
invest in capacity building, buy their fresh fruit bunches and guarantee a higher price for quality fresh
fruit bunches, etc.
In this way, smallholders and mills will follow the recommendation of Elinor Ostrom which is "to
use broad strategies of reciprocity 3 "'
Limitation: I have become aware that, oftentimes, mills do not behave in a responsible way and can
decide to stop working with smallholders at any time. In this case, smallholders cannot rely on them
as partners. Finding buyers of certified FFB (part c below) is then the only option they might have in
the short-run. If the price premium offered is high enough, it might be worth becoming certified.
Otherwise, it is very likely that smallholders will not engage in such a process.
Finding buyers for the Grcenpalmcertificates and a4 V( i'lgreeing onl aI atriig p(ri1c fo thai
The Greenpalm certificates have lost a lot of credibility amongst smallholders in the recent years
because the price has varied so dramatically. In addition to this, smallholders need a certain guarantee
on price to 'take the leap of faith'.
This can be achieved by finding buyers of fresh fruit bunches (either mills or retailers) willing to buy
the certificates at an 'off market' price, guaranteeing a minimum income for the farmers over the
medium run. New Britain Palm Oil Limited has set a floor price for the certificates it brought from
131 Ostrom, E, "Collective action and property ights for sustainable development", 2020 Vision. Focus 11. 2 (2004)
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all its associated smallholders when the prices plummeted in 2010 a132 ndJohnson & Johnson is
paying an off-market price to the 412 independent smallholders who were certified with the help of
the GIZ.
Johnson & Johnson buying Greenpalm Certificates at an off-market price: a good ROI in
terms of CSR
Offering an off-market deal to independent smallholders is whatJohnson & Johnson decided to
do for the project in GIZ. They offered an off market price in 2012 to buy certificates from the
412 independent smallholders certified with the help of the GIZ. Thanks to the off market deal,
which covers for the audit costs, the company has been able to communicate on this initiative as
part of their CSR policy. The company has gained a lot of visibility through this video they
published on YouTube and the LinkedIn page of the RSPO. Such an off market deal has enabled
them to differentiate themselves from their competitors and to communicate extensively on it.
Such agreements on a minimum price increase the confidence independent small holders have in the
certificate system and would make them more likely to "take the leap of faith" and work towards
becoming certified.
Possible solution to explore: Set a minimum price for Greenpalm certificates
In order to provide medium term financial incentives to smallholders, a floor price could be set by
the buyers of the GreenPalm certificates, either
-At the RSPO level: A floor price has been set for the whole FairTrade coffee industry when the price
markets were low. This floor price would have to be set by all the stakeholders concerned, as it was
the case for FairTrade coffee: "Floor prices were established after considerable field research and
several rounds of negotiation between representatives of the Fair Trade movement, farmers, and the
m New Britain Palm Oil Limited, "New Britain Palm Oil Sustainability Report 2010/11", NBPOL Sustainability report,
(2010)
83
coffee industry" 3". Farmers, the RSPO and the rest of the palm oil industry should therefore at the
same table and agree on a minimum price of certified FFB.
-At the local level: A price smoothing effort has been put in place in Uganda which consists of an
agreement between the government and a consortium for private sector oil palm plantations (called
OPUL). This agreement lays out a pricing formula at which farmers can sell their fresh fruit bunches
and that is calculated in such a way to ensure a fair and relatively stable income over time "4. This
price smoothing method could be extended to the Greenpalm certificates. It has not been done in
the Greenpalm system, to my understanding. If it were implemented, it might require the
intervention of the government or local authorities.
Setting up a fair price would increase the incentives for smallholders to become certified and give
more legitimacy to the Greenpalm certificate scheme, which has been highly criticized. For example,
regarding these certificates, Nick Thomson, CEO of NBPOL declared: "Paying fifty US cents per
ton to a palm oil producer who does not have access to a segregated supply chain via an offset
certificate, whilst the same consumer pays an unsustainable palm oil producer eleven hundred dollars
per ton makes no sense to me at all" 5." The Greenpalm certificates have been traded at prices that
are so low that they have ldst their credibility. It is very hard to convince the smallholders to 'trust'
the market when they learn how low such certificates can be traded at. A floor price would help
smallholders become more confident that they can extract value from the Greenpalm certificate
scheme.
13 Levi, M., et al., "Fair Trade: A Cup at a Time?", Politics and Society Volume 31 (2003)
The World Bank, FSG Sodial Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders: the Role of the
Private Sector", IFC reports (2010)
1s New Britain Palm Oil Limited, "New Britain Palm Oil Sustainability Report 2010/11", NBPOL Sustainability report
(2010)
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IV. B. 3) Making the certification process accessible
Best practices for this third necessary condition are to:
a) Limit audit costs smallholders have to bear
b) Make the certification process easier for smallholders
A) Liin-ut audit costs smallholders laNe to becar
Even if smallholders qualify for certification, audit costs can still be a deterrent. Their cost-benefit
analysis approach combined with the fact that they have a shorter-term perspective, in comparison
with larger organizations, make the audit costs an additional obstacle towards certification. Various
stakeholders have a role to play in this situation. In some cases, mills might want to pay the upfront
audit costs, like NBPOL did for all its associated smallholders. In other cases, retailers and
manufacturers might cover for the costs. This is whatJohnson & Johnson has done, indirectly, by
offering an off-market price for FFBs that would cover the audit costs.
Possible solution to explore: Create innovative solutions to support smallholder certification
The RSPO has recently announced' the creation of a Fund for Smallholders. Although little has
been said on it officially, it appears that its main mandate will be to subsidize the audit for
independent smallholders". This would be very helpful indeed but it has not yet been officialized. In
addition to this, the size of the fund might not be sufficient to support all the smallholders that could
benefit from becoming certified.
Engaging a wider range of stakeholders in funding the audit is an interesting idea, too. I have become
aware of this option looking at several examples from the Marine Stewardship Council. The MSC
FoodNavigator.om. "RSPO introduces smallholders support fund." (2013), last retrieved from the web on May 4th
2013: http://www.foodnavigator.com/Finand'al-Industry/RSPO-introduces-smallholders-support-fund
1 Based on the interview I onducted with Daniel May
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encourages and facilitates these types of funding initiatives, according to St6phanie Poey, the Head of
Communication for the MSC French branch, whom I interviewed on the topic of small fisheries.
One fishery in Gambia obtained certification after a German retailer, Kaufland, and its customers,
organized a fundraising campaign and collected enough money to finance the audit.
Of course, palm oil is not as 'visible' as fish. However, engaging other stakeholders to finance the
audit costs is still relevant. These stakeholders can then decide whether they wish to communicate on
it (like J&J did) or not.
) \Like thie cerification ro)CeSs eAsier for sal7(lhol() ders
Independent and associated smallholders have successfully managed to become certified. In my
conversation with Petra Meekers, Co Chair of the Smallholder Working group, she recognized that
this had been achieved thanks to the help stakeholders provided in extension, awareness and
guidance. The cases of NBPOL or the GIZ illustrate this statement well. Today, the mandate of the
Smallholder's Working Group is to make certification easier to achieve for smallholders.
Possible solution to explore: Create a stepwise or differential system for certification
This idea emerged from various readings and the interview conducted with M61anie Poey, from
Marine Stewardship Council France.
Today, the RSPO certification is made in such a way that producers either qualify or don't. Even
though the RSPO has made a special effort to adapt the implementation of the Principle & Criterias
to the different contexts and countries, there is no in between for smallholders. A way of addressing
this issue, and encouraging them to pursue their efforts towards certification could be to create a
stepwise process by which they could measure their progress and be encouraged to achieve higher
results.
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In the case of the MSC, the organization has developed a scoring system by which fisheries can
become certified, even if they do not meet the optimal level defined by the MSC. The system is the
following: Fisheries receive 0 to 100 points on 31 key indicators. The MSC requires fisheries to score
at least 60 on each key indicator and to score 80 on average, in every core category". They can then
pass the assessment if they commit to improving every key indicator up to the 80 level within 5 years:
"The MSC program very consciously allows fisheries to qualify for MSC certification without
meeting the 80 level on all indicators. MSC believes the movement of fisheries from the 60 to 80
levels is a positive outcome for the world's fisheries and directly in line with the MS C's vision. This is
one of the tenets of MSC's theory of change 39 n
This type of stepwise system is a factor of motivation for small fisheries and could be explored by
members of the RSPO to see if it would be helpful in motivating smallholders to seek certification.
However, the RSPO would need to make sure this does not compromise the integrity of its standard.
As we have seen in the first chapter of this paper, this is an issue that is particularly sensitive for the
RSPO and its critics.
IV. C. Limitations
Writing this last chapter, my intention was to create a discussion around the necessary conditions and
best practices I had identified. I recognize that further investigation and more trials would be
required. However, I kept in mind what I had read in Towards Better Practice in smallholder palm
138M "The MSC's standard for sustainable fishing is comprised of three ore prinples that require: 1) healthy fish stocks; 2) that
the fishery does not jeopardise the supporting eosystem; and, 3) thatmanagement systems ensure thelong-term futureof all
resources"., Harnessing Market Forces for PositiveEnvironmental Change, MSC reort (2011)
* MSC, "Harnessing Market Forces for Positive Environmental Change", MSC ert (2011)
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oil production" and I hope that the recommendations formulated can serve as a first basis for
further research.
140 "Smallholders, governments, companies and NGOs are coming up with solutions - partial or complete - to specific
constraints in smallholder palm oil production. Solutions are situation-specific, aising out of particular biophysical,
tenurial, market and policy conditions. This will limit the transferability of tools and innovations from one sucessful
context to another untried context. (...) But contextual differences do not mean lessons cannot be transferred -
practitioners can use their own best judgment to pic up and apply what might work from another context, and discard
what is irrelevant". Vermeulen, S., et al., "Towards Better practice in smallholder palm oil production", Natural Resource
Issues Series No. 5. International Institute for Environment and Development
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Conclusion
After highlighting the main bottlenecks preventing independent and associated smallholders from
achieving certification, we analyzed the situation through a collective action problem lens and
identified the reasons of success of two successful projects before determining the necessary
conditions for smallholders to achieve certification. Possible solutions to facilitate the process were
suggested in the last chapter of this paper and further research would be required to determine a
potential path towards implementation.
Although certification of palm oil smallholders still appears to be very challenging, this paper has
shown that there is hope for improvement:
-Some successful certification projects have started to emerge and the future 'certification
generations' can learn from them.
-The RSPO is conscious of this challenge and is working towards overcoming it. For example, the
Smallholder Working Group should meet earlyJuly 2013 to discuss about ways to facilitate the
access to certification for smallholders. The issue is slowly but surely progressing.
- Certification processes from other industries have also experienced challenges regarding small
farmers or firms and literature has shown us that these could be solved.
There is definitely a positive movement towards addressing smallholders' certification challenges in
the palm oil sector. The changes in the next years should be interesting to observe, and I hope this
paper will contribute to making them happen?
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Annex:
Annex 1: Factors explaining the future increase in demand for palm oil
The popularity of palm oil is due to the three following factors:
-Palm oil is very cost-competitive compared to other vegetable oils such as soybean oil, rapeseed oil
and sunflower seed oil. For this reason, palm oil has recently expanded in markets that traditionally
preferred other forms of oil.
-Palm oil's crop productivity is very high in comparison to all other types of vegetable oils. For
example, the average oil yield of palm oil is 3.8 tonnes per hectare which is 9.3, 7.6 and 5.8 times
greater than soybean oil, rapeseed oil and sunflower oil respectively (Oil World, 2008 "). "Producing
approximately 36% of the world's oils and fats from 6% of the world's oilseed acreage is a
compelling story in terms of land use efficiency", declared Nick Thomson, CEO of New Britain
Palm Oil Limited 2
-The usages of palm oil are be very diverse: for example, palm oil is a cooking ingredient, as well as
an essential ingredient in packaged food and domestic products, and can also be used in biofuels.
Today, although 80% of the current palm oil output is consumed for edible uses, the demand for
non-edible uses is increasing.
4 1 Teoh, Cheng Hai, "Key sustainability issues in the Palm Oil sector", The World Bank IFC Report 2010, page 7
142 New Britain Palm Oil Umited, "New Bitain Palm Oil Sustainability Report 2010/11", NBPOL Sustainability report
(2010) page 3
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Annex 2: Different Supply Chain systems for palm oil certification
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Annex 3: Interview of Darrel Weber for the BBC Food Program (extract)
The following extract from the BBC Food Program in 2011 is a conversation that reflects
the following interrogation: 'Is there a market for certified sustainable palm oil'?
Darrel Weber, RSPO Secretary general at the ime ofthe interview: "We have 5 million tons of
certified sustainable palm oil in the market. With that 5 million tons, basically, if all of
Europe wanted to purchase sustainable palm oil, they could. Tomorrow. But there is this
challenge in the supply chain (...) Because it's still only 10 or 11%. "
Interviewer "But campaigns on these issues have been running for more than a decade, the
RSPO itself was set up in 2004, and still yet, the available sustainable palm oil is being left
out there in the market without finding a buyer. It's staggering".
Darrel Weber "Yes, and we are ourselves trying to understand where are the bottlenecks
providing big hurdles for buyers to indeed buy Certified sustainable palm oil. And we
understand that at least one of the hurdles is with regards to the derivatives of palm oil for
the food industry. They don't use crude palm oil. They use the derivatives of crude palm oil
and it is not always easy to get the right amount at the right place at the right time".
Interviewer This does mean that we have UK-members of the RSPO, some of the biggest
food manufacturers in the world, who could be buying more and are not buying more. And
they are your members.
Darrel Weber "Yes, and we will be asking them this very same questions in the coming
months. We are still trying to understand the challenges within the supply chain. We still
don't quite understand why the uptake for the option of certificates, which are quite cheap
at the moment, is not more important at the moment".
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Annex 4: Synthesis of'Tackling the Collective action Problem in Palm Oil
Production'
"Tackling the collective action problem in palm oil production" is an article that focuses on the idea
that quality increase of fresh fruit bunches can be seen as a collective action problem in the Thai
palm oil industry.
"Tackling the collective action problem in palm oil production 0""
This publication deals with the introduction of certification standards in the Thai Palm Oil industry
and the collective action problem that prevents this implementation. It was co-authored by Daniel
May, the project director at the German International Cooperation (GIZ) who was involved in the
certification of 412 Thai independent smallholders in 2012 (cf. example on GIZ certification below)
and Thea Nielsen, a PhD candidate at the University of Hohenheim in Germany.
A needfor quaij contmlin thefreshfruit bunches prodution
So far, the Thai government's strategy to increase certified palm oil production in order to meet the
demand has been to expand oil palm production areas. The authors argue that this is the easiest way
of tackling the issue of increase in demand but that it leads to other difficulties. "As a consequence,
the government should reallocate its efforts to improving the OER through implementing FFB
quality control measures, although it is more difficult and requires significant investment in capacity
building of smallholders by both the government and the private sector".
The present sub-optimal OER in Thailand can be explained through the interplay of three processes:
-Mill overcapacity: "Since mills have the same policy of accepting whatever feedstock is offered,
suppliers of low quality FFBs can always find a buyer".
-The structure for harvesting and delivering FFBs: "Almost all producers pay labor services based on
the quantity of FFBs harvested and most FFBs have been exposed to excessive handling before
being processed at crushing mills".
-The underdevelopment of FFB quality control systems: "Very few agents along the supply chain
have quality control, as it is timely and costly. Only a very few mills use a price differentiation scherm
for different FFB qualities; however the premiums offered for high quality FFB with a high OER are
rather low".
The collective actionproblm identified
143 May, D., Nielsen, T., "Tadding the Collective action Problem in palm oil production", The Nation (2011), last
retrieved from the web on April 3rd 2013: http:/ /www.nationmultimedia.com /2011/08/05/opinion /Tackling-the-
collective-action-problem-in-palm-il-30162025.html
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This article demonstrates that introducing quality standards is a collective action problem: "it would
benefit the sector as a whole, but offers no immediate individual rewards to individual actors ". The
different actors will not implement changes on their own and, without cooperation, nothing can be
done. Change is handcuffed in the risk aversion of the actors as well as their lack of cooperation with
one another.
Overcoming the wollective actionproblem
The German International Cooperation (GIZ) and the Office of Agricultural Economics have
developed a project to support smallholders to increase their yield, improve the quality of their fruits
and to achieve certification. They have managed to overcome the collective action problem in this
situation and the authors wish that this example leads to more investments from the private sector
and the government in capacity building of independent smallholders. We will study this specific case
in more details in Part B of this chapter.
94
Bibliography
Web sources
FoodNavigator.com. "RSPO introduces smallholders support fund." (2013), last retrieved from the
web on May 4* 2013: http: //www.foodnavigator.com/Financial-Industry/RSPO 
-introduces-
smallholders-support-fund
Ghananews agency.org, "Unilever to divest interest in Benso, Twifo oil palm plantations", Web
(2010), last retrieved from the web on April 10*2013:
http://www.ghananewsagency.org/details/Economics/Unilever-to-divest-interest-in-Benso-Twifo-
oi-1palm-plantations /?ci=3&ai= 11949
Malaysian Palm Oil Board official website, "Unilever shifts Ivory Coast interest from palm oil to
soap", 1/_ (2008), last retrieved from the web on May 9 2013:
http: / /bepi.mpob.gov.my/news /detail.php?id=5139
Mongabay.com. "Alleged moratorium breach becomes test for RSPO.", Web (2011), last retrieved
from the web on March 4th 2013: http://news.mongabay.com/2011/0623-
rspo breach klk.html#RdsvUC5CP9bsOEfB.99
Rainforest Action Network, "Girl scouts and Palm Oil", Wh (2011), retrieved from the internet on
March 26th 2013: http:/ /ran.org/giri-scouts-and-palm-oil
Rainforest Action Network Blog. "RSPO Missing Persons Report Rainforest Action Network
Blog.", Web (2008), last retrieved from the web on April 13 2013:
http: / /understory.ran. org/20 11 /11 /22 /ran-campaigner-goes-head-to-head-with-malaysian-
government-minister-at-rspo
Rspo.org. "Smallholders Working Group - Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil." (2011), last
retrieved from the web on 2 May 2013. : http://www.rspo.org /en/smallholders working group
RtlO.rspo.org. "RT10 - Vision & Mission." 2013. Web. 12 May 2013.
http: / /www.rt1O.rspo.org /c /vision-mission/
Sustainablepalmoil.org. "The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) | Sustainable Palm Oil
Platform." (2013), lastretrieved from the web 4 April 2013:
http: / /www.sustainablepalmoil.org/standards -certfication/certification-schemes /the-roundtable-on-
sustainable-palm-oil-rspo/
TheGrocer.co.uk, "Sustainable palm oil needs stronger market signals", (2013), last retrieved from
the web on April 15 * 2013: http: / /www.thegyrocer.co.uk /opinion/letters /sustainable -palm-oil-
needs-stronger-market-signals /237936
95
WWF, "Palm Oil.", Web (2008), last retrieved from the web on 4 May 2013:
http: / /wwf.panda.org/what we do/how we work/businesses /transforming markets /solutions/m
ethodology /multi stakeholders /palm oil/
WWF. "2011 Palm Oil Buyers' Scorecard.", Web (2011),last retrieved from the web on April 3 d:
http://wwfpanda.org/what we do/footprint/agriculture/palm oil/solutions/responsible purchasi
ng/scorecard201 1 /
Papers and publications
Bek-Nielsen, C., "A perspective on palm oil and its sustainability", Paper presented at Palm Oil and
Lauric Oils Conference POC2010. Kuala Lumpur, 2010 (2010)
Cashore, B., et al., "Governing through markets: Forest certification and the emergence of Non -State
Authority", New Haven: Yale University Press (2004), Print
Dallinger, G., "Oil palm Expansion in South East Asia: trends and implications for local
communities and indigeneous people - Chapter 1: Oil Palm Development in Thailand: economic,
social and environmental considerations", Forest Peoples Programme and SawitWatch report series
(n*6), (2011)
Espach, R., "When is Sustainable Forestry Sustainable? The Forest Stewardship Council in Argentina
and Brazil", Global Environmental Politics. Volume 6. Number2. May 2006. (2006), 55-84
Gereffi, G., et al., "The governance of global value chains", Review of International Political
Economy 12:1 (2005). 78-104
Levi, M., et al., "Fair Trade: A Cup at a Time?", Politics and Society. Volume 31 (2003)
Locke, R., Amengual, M., Mangla A., "Virtue out of Necessity? Compliance, Commitment, and the
Improvement of Labor Conditions in Global Supply Chains", Politics & Society. Sep2009. Vol. 37
Issue 3. p319-351 (2009).
May, D., Nielsen, T., "Tackling the Collective action Problem in palm oil production", The Nation
(2011), last retrieved from the web on April 3" 2013:
http: / /www.nationmultimedia.com/ 2 011/08/05/opinion/Tackling-the-collective-action-problem-
in-palm-oil-30162025.html
96
Marine Stewardship Council, "Hamessing Market Forces for Positive Environmental Change", MSC
report (2011)
MittaineJ. F.., "The globalization of international oilseeds trade", Oleagineux. Corps Gras, Lipides
Volume 19. Num6ro 5. 249-60 (2012)
Nadvi, Khalid. "The Effect of Global Standards on Local Producers: A Pakistani Case Study." Ed.
Hubert Schmitz.Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.:; Elgar, 2004.297-325
New Britain Palm Oil Limited, "New Britain Palm Oil Sustainability Report 2010/11", NBPOL
Sustainability report. (2010) page 3
O'Rourke, D. ,"Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongove mmental Systems of Labor Standards
and Monitoring", The Policy Studies Journal. Vol. 31. No. 1. 2003 (2003)
Ostrom, E., "Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action",
Cambridge Univ. Press, (1990)
Ostrom, E, "Collective action and property rights for sustainable development", 2020 Vision. Focus
111, 2 (2004)
Persey, S., et al., "Towards Sustainable Palm Oil: a Framework for Action", Proforest report (2011),
last retrieved from the web on April 6* 2013:
http: / /www.1proforest.net/objects /publications /towards -sustainable-palm-oil-a-framework-for-
action
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, "Palm Oil Plantation, Industry landscape, regulatory and financial
overview", PwC Indonesia reports (2012), last retrieved from the web on May 7 1h 2013:
http://www.pwc.com/id/en/publications/assets/palm-oil-plantation-2012.pdf
Rist, Lucy, Laurene Feintrenie, and Patrice Levang. "The Livelihood Impacts of Oil Palm:
Smallholders in Indonesia." Biodiversity and Conservation 19.4 (2010): 1009-24. ProQuest. Web. 5
May 2013.
RSPO, "RSPO Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production: Guidance on Scheme
Smallholders", RSPO Working Paper (2009)
RSPO, "RSPO Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production: Guidance for
Independent Smallholders under Group Certification", RSPO Working Paper (2010), last retrieved
from the web on April 3rd:
http://www.rspo.org/files/project/siallholders/Final%20RSPO/ 20Guidance%20on%20Scheme
%20Smallholders%20as%20approved.pdf
97
SAI Global, "Challenges and Limitations of RSPO Program Audi: a review based on auditing
experiences of SAI Global Indonesia", SAI Global presentation at at RT10 (2012), last retrieved
from the web on March 4th 2013:
http: / /rtl 0. rspo.org/ckfinder/userfiles /Files /PC7 4%20Inge%2OTriwulandari%20Presentation.pdf
Sheil, D., et al., "The impacts and opportunities of oil palm in Southeast Asia, What do we know and
what do we need to know?", CIBOR Occasional Paper No. 51 (2009), Page 4, last retrieved from the
web on May 3rd 2013: http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdfjfiles/OccPapers/OP-51.pdf
Tendler, J., "Good Government in the Tropics", Johns Hopkins Studies in Development (1997)
Teoh, Cheng Hai, "Key sustainability issues in the Palm Oil sector", The World Bank, IFC report
(2010)
Tewari, Meenu, Poonam Pillai. "Global Standards and the Dynamics of Environmental Compliance
in India's Leather Industry." Oxford Development Studies. (2005):245-67
The World Bank, FSG Social Impact Advisor, "Improving the Livelihoods of Palm Oil Smallholders:
the Role of the Private Sector", IFC reports (2010), last retrieved from the web April 4th 2013:
http: / /wwv.fsg.org /Portals /0/Uploads/Documents /PDF/Palm Oil Smallholder Livelihoods.pdf
?cpgnWXXT%20DL%20-.%20 Improving%20Livelihoods%20of% 2OPalm200il%)20Smallholders
Vermeulen, S., et al., "Towards Better practice in smallholder palm oil production", Natural
Resource Issues Series No. 5. International Institute for Environment and Development, (2006)
Wild Asia (Malaysia), "A review of Smallholder Oil Palm Production: Challenges and Opportunities
for Enhancing Sustainability. A Malaysian perspective", White Paper (2012)
World Wildlife Fund, "Profitability and Sustainability in Palm Oil industry: analysis of incremental
Financial Costs and Benefits of RSPO compliance", WWF reports, (2012)
98
